This post addresses direct objections to the theory that parents have enforceable positive obligations to their children as a result of the creation of peril. There are also consequentialist arguments against this theory and these are addressed in a different post.
Ten objections have been made to the argument that parents have responsibility for a child's state of peril:
- Creating a child is not an act of aggression and therefore does not incur obligations.
- Parental obligations are only valid if voluntarily agreed to.
- Unborn children commit aggression against their mothers, so parents cannot be obligated to them.
- Giving life is a net benefit and therefore parents are not obligated further.
- Adoptive parents disprove the causal theory of parental obligation.
- It is too difficult to determine who caused a baby to exist, therefore parents don't have obligations by causal action.
- Causal action leads to insufficient parental obligations
- Creation of peril only occurs if someone's rights have already been violated, but creating a child does not violate rights.
- The non-identity problem means there is no creation of peril.
- The concept of parental obligations is merely a cover for prejudice or ulterior motives.
Objection 1: Creating A Child Is Not An Act of Aggression and Therefore Does Not Incur Obligations
This argument is that the only way to incur positive obligations is by voluntary agreement or as restitution for an invasive act of aggression. Since creating a child cannot be classed as an act of aggression, obligations do not arise from being the cause of a child's creation. Elizabeth Brake made this argument.
This objection misses the point of creation of peril. Certain actions create a positive obligation without voluntary agreement and without having committed a crime. The obligation is essentially to prevent a crime from taking place for which one has set the causal chain in motion but which has not yet taken effect.
The parents have not harmed the child or aggressed against it by creating it, but they have created the peril that the child is in. If the parents do not look after the child, the child will die. The parents are the cause of the child being in a state of mortal danger. Their obligations are not to provide restitution for a harm done. Rather, they are obligated to prevent harm from taking place. The responsibility is to stop the peril from turning into harm.
Objection 2: Obligations Are Only Valid If Voluntarily Agreed To
The assertion that the only way to incur positive obligations is by voluntary agreement or as restitution for an invasive act of aggression leads to another objection against parental obligations. This is the argument that parental obligations only apply in cases where the parents voluntarily accept them, and not as a result of causal action. Walter Block asserts that parents cannot have obligations if they did not intend to have children:
The father, and the mother too, violated no one's rights by engaging in voluntary sexual intercourse. All of a sudden, well nine months later, there is another human being in great need of care. Neither parent, we posit, … desired any such outcome. Indeed, they took steps to prevent it. There is nothing in all of libertarian law that would make criminals of these two people if they refused to raise this baby.
The causal principle is that people are responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions. A foreseeable consequence of consensual sex is the creation of a child. Therefore, even if the parents in a given case did not intend to have a child, they are still responsible for it. It is simply an assertion that obligations can only arise through voluntary agreement or as restitution. There is nothing in libertarian theory to prevent tort obligations that arise from the creation of peril as a consequence of reasonably foreseeable action. This is the origin of parental obligations.
Objection 3: Unborn Children Initiate Aggression Against Their Mothers
This argument was advanced by Williamson Evers, who was influenced by Judith Jarvis Thomson. Evers in turn influenced Rothbard, who characterised unborn children as "coercive parasites" following this argument. Evers' line of argument is:
An unborn child "attaches itself" to the mother, "burrows into the wall of the womb" and "expands like Alice-in-Wonderland in the rabbit's house".
These actions constitute an "attack" by the unborn child on the mother and are "aggressive" in character (i.e an act of initiatory aggression).
Since the mother has been aggressed against, she has not put the unborn child in a state of peril by creating it.
Therefore parents in general do not put their children in peril by creating them.
There are things to contest in every premise of this argument, and even if you accept the premises, the conclusions do not follow. Using odd or aggressive words to describe various facts of pregnancy does not prove children are aggressors against their mothers. It is simply a fact of nature that babies embed in the womb and grow. This is not an act of aggression, it is a natural consequence of getting pregnant. The mother's own body plays the decisive role in facilitating, regulating, and nurturing the entire process.
Furthermore, there is no sense in which describing the steps of pregnancy using weird language challenges the core thesis regarding peril (that creating a child entails creating a situation of helplessness, and therefore responsibility). Evers' does not refute this.
Yet further, given his argument is all based around describing pregnancy, Evers also
A) ignores fathers completely, as if they have nothing to do with any questions of responsibility; and
B) fails to show how any of this relates to children once they are born (he merely asserts that the same conclusions from the pregnancy example somehow apply).
Objection 4: Giving Life Is A Net Benefit And Therefore Parents Are Not Obligated Further
This argument has the following form:
When parents create children, they are giving them the gift of life.
Life is a net benefit.
Since the parents have benefitted the child by creating him, it would be an injustice if on top of that they were obliged to provide other things.
Having been created is not something that is susceptible to cost-benefit analysis. Even if one accepts the premise that life is a gift of incomparable worth (which I do), gifts do not nullify other obligations. The two are separate. This is especially the case since the obligation in this case is to relieve a state of peril. If I take you up in an aircraft, give you a million dollars in cash, and then parachute out of the plane leaving you unable to fly, I cannot legitimately argue "I gave you an enormous gift, therefore I don't have obligations to you!".
Evers makes this gift-of-life argument using an analogy. He argues that it would be unjust for someone who saves a child from a car crash (in which both parents have been killed) to then be lumbered with responsibility for the child.
There is something fundamentally different about this analogy. When parents create a child, they change the state of the universe from one in which there was no child in peril to one in which a rights-bearing child is in peril (the fact that the child did not exist beforehand is irrelevant to this argument). In contrast, the rescuer in Evers' example did not create the peril. He merely alleviates some of the immediate peril that a child was already in.
Arguably, whilst the rescuer still has the baby in his hands, he does indeed have a responsibility for it. He cannot simply abandon the baby directly after saving it from the accident. Although the rescuer was not obliged to save the child initially, once he did so it would seem to follow that he has to keep looking after that person until
A) he finds someone else who can take over the responsibility; or
B) the child is no longer helpless.
However, it does not follow that the rescuer would be the one responsible to raise the child to adulthood. In real life, there are many cultural practices to address what would happen in cases where both parents die, such as written wills that state who should have custody, or the practice of assigning godparents.
This kind of tragic accident is a foreseeable risk, so one of the positive obligations that parents have is to make arrangements for their children's care in the event that both parents die before the children reach adulthood.
Another way of framing the net-benefit argument is that since being born does not worsen a child's situation, it does not generate obligations. Both Walter Block and Łukasz Dominiak have made the argument that creating a child must be viewed as a net positive and so cannot be a source of liability for obligations. Their argument is that it is better to be born helpless than not born at all, therefore parents don't have an obligation to remove the helplessness.
The reductio ad absurdum of this idea is that it is better to be born into a highly abusive family than not to be born at all, therefore parents have no obligation to refrain from abusing their children. Block even uses this same logic when he argues that it is better to be created for a few months and then killed via abortion than to not have been created at all, therefore abortion cannot be a rights violation. He does not seem to view this as a reductio, but it seems self-evidently absurd to me.
Another way that the argument is posed is that there is no way to come into existence as a human without being helpless, and since being created is a net benefit, helplessness just comes as part of the package and is not a source of obligation. But this is merely to assert that no obligation is incurred. The fact that there is no way of creating a child that does not put the child in a state of peril logically implies that creating children incurs obligations, not that children just have to accept that they are helpless.
Objection 5: Adoptive Parents Disprove The Causal Theory of Parental Obligation
The adoptive-parents objection is an argument against any causal theory of parental obligation (and state of peril is a causal theory of parental obligations).
This argument is simply:
- Adoptive parents have the same obligations as natural parents
- Adoptive parents are not the cause of their children's existence
- Therefore parental obligations do not come from being the cause of a child's existence.
This argument has been made by Williamson Evers and Roderick Long.
It is not being the cause of creation that generates a positive obligation for the parents, it is the causal responsibility for creation of peril. Adoptive parents do create peril for a child by removing them from their natural parents (regardless of whether those natural parents are unwilling or incompetent). Therefore, adoptive parents do acquire obligations to the child as a result of creation of peril, albeit in a different way to natural parents.
The child has a claim against his natural parents as a result of creation of peril and the adoptive parents have deprived him of the chance to benefit from his rightful claim. The fact that the natural parents may have been unwilling or unable to care for the child does not invalidate this claim, nor does any contract that the adoptive parents made with the natural parents (the child was never involved in any contract and cannot be said to have given up his claim). In addition, the fact that we judge it to be in the child's best interest to be adopted (and therefore ultimately in his best interest to be deprived of his rightful claim against his natural parents) also does not invalidate his claim or change the fact that the adoptive parents have deprived him of the chance to benefit from it. In this way, the adoptive parents become causally responsible for a child's state of peril.
What about the case of abandoned babies? One might argue that in this special case the parenting as charity theory is valid. I think that even in this case, adoptive parents are depriving the child of their natural parent (letting the natural parents off the hook for liability to the child's claim) and therefore they become responsible for the child's helpless state.
I have also addressed the question of adoptive parents in a separate post here.
Objection 6: It is Too Difficult to Determine Who Caused a Baby to Exist Therefore Parents Don't Have Obligations by Cause
This objection is that parents cannot be ascribed obligations as a result of their role in creating a child because many people played a role in the causal chain that led to the child's creation (for example the grandparents by creating the parents, the matchmaker who got them together, the lab technician in the case of IVF, etc). The worry is that too many people will be implicated in parental obligations. Theresa Baron has argued this.
For justice to be done, an objective set of rules is needed to allocate responsibility for a baby having been placed in a state of peril. For the vast majority of babies, this is entirely uncomplicated. In those rare cases where it becomes more complex, human beings can use reasoned argument within a legal system to generate precedent and case law about how to handle such cases. It is also worth noting that some of the complex cases such as IVF may only be more complicated because they involve morally illegitimate practices, but that will be addressed in a future post.
I do not consider it reasonable to argue that it is impossible to allocate parental responsibility because we can't tell who created a baby.
Another variant of this objection is to argue that the concept of causal parental obligations is so complex that the theory cannot be discussed or refuted. Brighouse & Swift's book "Family Values" is ostensibly about "the ethics of parent-child relationships", yet they fail to address or refute the causal theory of parental obligations. Their excuse for evading the question is that the issue is too complex and "needs further specification":
Do children have a right to a parent, the right to be parented? Do they have, as some have argued, a right to parents, to a mother and a father? Can they claim a right to be parented by a particular adult, or by particular adults, such as those who procreatively brought them into being? Though we will say something about these big and difficult questions, we cannot provide a comprehensive treatment; they need further specification before they can properly be addressed, and, on receiving that specification, they quickly disaggregate into a variety of different, and difficult, issues.
Objection 7: Causal Action Leads To Insufficient Parental Obligations
This objection holds that parental obligations from causal action do not obligate parents to do enough. If parents only have to alleviate the state of peril then parental obligation will not be sufficiently weighty, therefore parental obligations must be based on something else. Elizabeth Brake made this argument. She admits that some kind of obligations follow from causal action but argues that not enough obligations do.
This objection is based on the mere assertions and personal judgements. It is a mere assertion that causal responsibility for state of peril only generates limited obligations and personal judgement that those obligations are not enough.
One can just as easily assert that the obligations arising from causal actions are enormously weighty. Since peril is only alleviated once a child is a self-sufficient, healthy adult, parental obligations might be judged to involve an enormous amount of sacrifice. As just one example, a child needs love in order to grow into a self-sufficient adult. Just as a malnourished childhood would lead to actionable harm, so would a loveless childhood. Providing loving care to a child is not a superficial task.
The key reason that this objection fails is because it is self-contradictory by definition. The only way to demonstrate that parental obligations from causal action are insufficient would be to show that a child did not grow into a self-sufficient, healthy adult as a result of having received inadequate care from their parents. But if the child did not grow up to be healthy and self-sufficient because they received inadequate care, then the parents by definition did not fulfil their obligations.
The obligation is to do whatever is necessary to prevent the bad outcome. If the bad outcome occurs by omission of action of the parents, then the obligation has not been fulfilled by definition.
Objection 8: Creation of Peril Only Occurs if Someone's Rights Have Already Been Violated but Creating a Child Does Not Violate Rights.
This objection is similar to the argument that parental obligation only occurs if rights have been violated by aggression, but in this case the argument is that creation of peril itself only occurs when aggression has taken place. Since creating a child or giving birth are not in themselves invasive rights violations, the argument is that no creation of peril can be said to have taken place. Łukasz Dominiak has made this argument.
This argument uses an absurd definition of peril. Creation of peril means putting someone in danger. Putting someone in danger comes before you have actually violated their rights. If I start a huge fire in my backyard, I may put my neighbour's house in danger, although not yet actually damage it. I have an obligation to prevent the fire from spreading out of control to my neighbour's house. This obligation exists precisely to prevent the invasion happening. My obligation to mitigate peril is no use to anyone if I let the peril convert to actual harm. I am not free to ignore all the foreseeable risks I can create for others right up until I actually hurt people.
On this absurd definition it would not count as the creation of peril for me to plant landmines all over the beach, it would only be creation of peril when somebody actually stepped on one and blew up.
I agree that creating a child is not in itself a rights violation, but that is irrelevant to the question of creation of peril.
Objection 9: The Non-Identity Problem Means There Is No Creation of Peril
Dominiak appeals to the non-identity problem as an argument against creation of peril. The non-identity problem refers to moral questions regarding people who do not yet exist, such as whether it is right or wrong to create a person if that person may face particular difficulties in life, or alternatively whether it is right or wrong to do things that may negatively impact people who do not exist yet.
This problem is irrelevant to the question at hand, since the argument is not that creating a child is an act of aggression. It is true that children do not consent to be born, but it is also true that creating a child is not an act of aggression. It happens to be the case that as a consequence of being created, a child is put into a state of peril. The parents are responsible for this: they changed the state of the universe from one in which there was no specific child in peril to one in which a specific child is in peril. The question at hand is not whether they should have had the child or not, rather it is what obligations do they have now that they have created a child. Therefore, the non-identity problem is irrelevant.
Objection 10: The Concept of Parental Obligations Is Merely a Cover for Prejudice or Ulterior Motives
Roderick Long dismisses the idea that abortion is incompatible with parental obligations by claiming that this concept of parental obligations is merely sexism:
The “parental obligations” objection to abortion, like the refusal to recognize rape in marriage, appears to stem from a traditional attitude that refuses to acknowledge women as autonomous individuals, and regards their bodies as mere resources to be used by family members. On this view, a woman is not an independent moral being worthy of respect in her own right, but instead exists only for the sake of her family relationships, and has her moral identity and standing only within that context.
It would be logically consistent if Long were to also argue that the idea of fathers' parental obligations is merely a misandrist prejudice which sees men as nothing but providers of resources for family members and not individuals etc., but Long does not apply the same logic to men and has no problem with fathers having obligations as a result of their actions.
This objection is nothing more than an ad hominem fallacy and utterly fails to refute the logic of causal parental obligations.
Brighouse & Swift simply assert that children have no claim against their biological parents without refuting the causal argument. Instead, they characterise acknowledgement of children's claims on their parents as mere cultural prejudice ("bionormativity"):
Our articulation of the child’s interest in a relationship with a parent makes no reference to biological connection. Nothing important need be lacking, from the child’s point of view, if she is raised by an adult without that connection, so children raised by adoptive parents have no complaint, no claim against their biological parents that they be the adults with whom they have a relationship of the kind we have described… our account of children’s interests simply fails to recognize the very important interest that children have in being parented by an adult to whom they are biologically connected… We could agree that children are owed the kind of parenting they need to develop a sense of self and the capacity for agency, while denying that they must be provided with what they need for the particular, biologically informed, identity that is currently culturally dominant. Perhaps, while discharging our obligations to current children seeking a healthy identity in a culture dominated by particular ways of finding it, we should also be challenging “bionormativity.”
This is another example of retreat to ad hominem.