The Dark Side of the Children's Liberation Movement

The children's liberation movement emerged in the 1970s, drawing inspiration from the feminist movement and other social changes of the period. Two of its most influential manifestos were Escape From Childhood by John Holt and Birthrights by Richard Farson. David Archard summarised the movement's core propositions:

The basic claims of the children’s liberationists are that the modern separation of the child’s and adult’s worlds is an unwarranted and oppressive discrimination; that this segregation is accompanied and reinforced by a false ideology of ‘childishness’; and that children are entitled to all the rights and privileges possessed by adults.

My aim in this article is to point out the dark side of the children's liberation movement. Before doing so, I acknowledge that the movement also had some good ideas. In particular, I have learned a great deal from John Holt. His book Escape from Childhood contains many entirely valid critiques of the abuse of power over their children by parents. His book Instead of Education is an excellent critique of schooling with useful suggestions for alternative ideas for education.

Justifying Sexual Abuse of Children

The children's liberation movement was highly skeptical of parental authority. The core idea that came out of the movement is the view that parents have no right to act paternalistically towards children and that paternalism is itself a kind of abuse of parental power. As a corollary of this view, parents (and other adults) should treat children in the same way that they would treat a rights-bearing adult.

There are numerous problems with this theory but I want to focus on the most significant implication of this view: the idea that children can consent.

People are responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions. Since children have not yet reached a level of rationality that enables them to foresee the consequences of their actions, they are not able to meaningfully consent to contracts, medical decisions, sexual activity, or other agreements.

The child liberationist movement denied this. Since restrictions on children were seen as illegitimate, child liberationists argued that children are able to consent to contracts and, most significantly, to sex. Richard Farson clearly states this in Birthrights:

What it does advocate is the freedom for children to conduct their own sexual lives with no more restrictions than adults. Further, that all sex activity be decriminalized so that sexual experimentation and sexual acts between consenting people can be enjoyed without fear of punishment. If all this sounds too open and free, we must recognize that in this society—when it comes to matters of sexuality—we are not likely to err in the direction of too much freedom.

If "all sex activity" is decriminalized, this means that adults would be able to have sex with children. This is justifying, defending, and excusing such evils as pedophilia, incest, and the sexual abuse of children. This is the dark side of the children's liberation movement and it can be seen in all the writings of the period.

The theorists of the movement do not deny that their views logically entail that adults should be able to have sex with children. Instead, they make a range of excuses and minimisations.

The argument child liberationists used to defend their views on child sex was as follows:

1. The child liberationists claimed that society has an unrealistic view of children as asexual or innocent.
2. They cited evidence to show that children have sexual feelings.
3. They argued that since children are sexual beings (and not innocent), therefore sex with children should be allowed.

Whether or not society has an unrealistic view of children's sexuality is irrelevant to the moral question of whether a child can consent. Whether a child has sexual feelings is beside the point: children cannot meaningfully consent. The presence or absence of sexual feelings in the child has no bearing on whether they can consent. The declared consent of a child has no bearing on whether an adult who has sex with the child has committed a crime because a child's consent is not meaningful.

Grooming

What the children's liberation advocates argue is that there is no such thing as grooming. This follows logically from their argument that children can consent. According to this idea, all that a pedophile would need to do is persuade a child that sexual activity is beneficial to the child, and then the pedophile would not be committing a crime, since the child "consented".

John Holt dismisses the risk of grooming by asserting that children are capable of sexual desire and therefore are not victims. In Escape from Childhood he writes:

Some people have voiced to me the fear that if it were legal for an adult to have sex with a consenting child, many young people would be exploited by unscrupulous older ones. The image here is of the innocent young girl and the dirty old man; few worry about the young boy having sex with an older woman. Here, too, we are caught with the remains of old myths–in this case, that only men were sexual, that women were pure and above it–from which it follows that any young girl having sex with an older man must necessarily be his victim.

Pedophiles seek out children who are vulnerable precisely because such children will be much easier to persuade and so the pedophile can commit their crime with much less resistance from the child. Vulnerable children are highly suggestible because they are not being cared for and protected by their parents. This vulnerability is exploited by pedophiles. This evil exploitation of children who have already been neglected and harmed is what grooming is. Yet child liberationists deny the existence of grooming.

Incest

How can children's liberation advocates seriously defend an evil such as incest? The main defence is to minimise the gravity of this crime by claiming that it is not a big deal and kids turn out fine. Here is how Richard Farson argues it:

Incest and sexual activity within the family, whether it be father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister or any homosexual combination of those partners, is far more common and far less traumatic than we have always been led to believe.

In a disgusting passage, Farson agrees with someone he cites who argues that fathers should be able to have sex with daughters in order to preserve the family if the mother is unable to have sex:

Sometimes incest occurs because it become functional to the preservation of the family, for example, if the wife is an invalid. When a family member, as Bagley puts it, "is socialized in the norms of incest, whether it is seen by the family to be functional for the survival of the family or because it is desired for some other reason by some dominant family members, the evidence from case histories shows that incest can be accepted by the younger partner with equanimity." This is literally arguing that parents may use their children as sex objects and that the children will be fine.

Farson uses a long quote from Karl Menninger's 1942 book "Love Against Hate" to argue that incest has positive benefits:

The assumption is, of course, that children are irreparably ruined by such experiences. Without intending in the least to justify or excuse such criminal behavior I may nevertheless point out that in the cold light of scientific investigation no such devastating effects usually follow (a fact which I hope will be of some comfort to certain anguished parents). Two psychiatrists (Lauretta Bender and Abram Blau) recently made a careful follow-up study of such cases and concluded that children exposed to premature sexual experiences with adults frequently turn out to be "distinguished and unusually charming and attractive in their outward personalities." The conclusion to be drawn from such observations need not be shocking; they simply bear out our contention that sexuality is not the evil and horrible thing it is generally conceived to be. Such experiences are traumatic to the child only when connected with deep hostilities; the furtive and desperate nature of such attacks, combined with the attitude of society toward them, tends entirely in the direction of unbearably stimulating the child's hostilities so that he conceives of sex as brutality. But when the experience actually stimulates the child erotically, it would appear from the observations of the authors cited just above that it may favor rather than inhibit the development of social capabilities and mental health in the so-called victims.

Menninger asserts that he doesn't intent do justify or excuse incest, but immediately goes on to do both. The implicit assumption in this despicable quote is that the child has consented to sex. Again, children cannot meaningfully consent.

Menninger assumes that children who have been abused are fine because they are "unusually charming and attractive". His skill as a psychologist doesn't seem to be enough to make the obvious connection that children in such circumstances may appear charming because they have had to adapt their personalties to please adults as a matter of survival.

The contemptible nature of his arguments can be seen by replacing incest with rape and making the same argument: e.g. rape is not such a big deal because the victims have better "social capabilities" afterwards etc.

Citing Child Sexual Abuse of Babies As Evidence

As part of the argument that children should be viewed as sexually active, Farson cites the crank Alfred Kinsey's 1953 book Sexual Behavior in the Human Female :

Full display of physiologic changes which are typical of the response of an adult have been observed in both female and male infants as young as four months of age. This citation is itself evidence of sexual molestation of babies that was undertaken by Kinsey in his research. Kinsey did experiments on children to see how many orgasms they could have within 24 hours. He documented this in a table in his book.

Pedophilia

Farson has another argument to justify pedophilia: the claim that children enjoy sex with adults and that it is really hurting the child to treat pedophilia as wrong. He quotes Germaine Greer, who minimised incest and claimed positive benefits:

One woman I know enjoyed sex with an uncle all through her childhood, and never realized that anything unusual was toward until she went away to school. What disturbed her then was not what her uncle had done but the attitude of her teachers and the school psychiatrist. They assumed that she must have been traumatized and disgusted and therefore in need of very special help. In order to capitulate to their expectations, she began to fake symptoms that she did not feel, until at length she began to feel truly guilty about not having been guilty. She ended up judging herself very harshly for this innate lechery.

Note that Greer simply assumes that the child could legitimately consent to sex and so it doesn't even occur to her to address whether the adult had done anything wrong.

Increased Child Sexualisation

Another bizarre argument by child liberationists is that if there were increased sexualisation of children, this would protect children from sexual abuse. The argument is essentially that society is too repressed about sex and that if everyone just lightened up then children would be able to resist sexual advances because sex would not be such a big deal. John Holt argues this in Escape from Childhood:

A mother of three daughters told me once that because she, speaking for society, was able to tell one of her daughters that she could not sleep with a young man who wanted to sleep with her and was using various kinds of blackmail in order to get her to do it; the daughter was protected. She did not have to say no for herself. She could even say things like, "I'd like to but my mother would kill me." But this is all in the context of a society in which men exploit women as sex objects. In a society such as I propose, the dangers (to the daughter) of sex would be less. At the same time the pressure on the young man to make a conquest would also be much less. If sex were not seen as dangerous, romantic, and ecstatic, and at the same time dirty and disgusting, there would be less need to protect people from it, and they would be more able to protect themselves. Women who did not feel that their worth depended on their being sexually attractive to men would not be swayed by the kind of blackmail boys use on girls today--indeed, they would be turned away by it. A young man who tried it would soon be out of luck.

Did Holt seriously think that children can defend themselves from manipulative sexual aggression simply by being more familiar with sex?

The Wider Movement for Legitimising Child Sexual Abuse

It was not only Farson and Holt who made arguments to legitimise pedophilia. Many other thinkers of the postwar period also argued for this.

Shulamith Firestone's influential radical feminist tract The Dialectic of Sex had a chapter on child liberation in which she called for "The sexual freedom of all women and children" so that "now they can do whatever they wish to do sexually". She explicitly defends incest, stating:

Thus, without the incest taboo, adults might return within a few generations to a more natural polymorphous sexuality, the concentration on genital sex and orgasmic pleasure giving way to total physical/emotional relationships that included that. Relations with children would include as much genital sex as the child was capable of – probably considerably more than we now believe

In 1977, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Simone de Beauvoir, and other intellectuals signed a petition to the French parliament calling for the decriminalization of all "consensual" sexual relations between adults and minors below the age of fifteen, the age of consent in France at the time.

Conclusion

The children's liberation movement was at its best when criticising the abuse of power by parents and by the State. It went seriously wrong when suggesting alternative norms for relationships between adults and children.

The core philosophical problem with the children's liberation movement is that the authors had no real theory of what the parental role is. In particular, they did not have a coherent theory of parental obligations or parental authority.

Do parents have enforceable obligations to their children? If so, what should those obligations be? Both Holt and Farson were vague on this question.

Do parents have any basis for parental authority? Holt and Farson were skeptical but never fully repudiated parental authority. They were not advocates of abolishing the family like Shulamith Firestone. Yet they never clarified what parents should have authority to do. Holt accepted that parents have authority to make rules about what goes on in their own home as homeowners, but he left it at that.

Since they lacked a theory of the parental role, the children's liberation advocates viewed parents as if they were merely some benevolent friends of the children and children as if they were just small adults.

Neither Holt nor Farson thought about the causal responsibility parents have for the state of peril that children are in. Nor did they consider the implication of this principle: that parents have an enforceable obligation to remove their children from a state of peril by raising them to the safety and self sufficiency of adulthood.

If they had thought about the parental role in light of this principle, they would have argued that parents have a clear obligation to protect their children from sexual predators, as part of their more general obligation to get their kids out of peril. And they would have argued that in order to fulfil that obligation, parents have authority to act as guardians of their children, including protecting their children from predators, dangers, and consequences that their children do not yet fully comprehend.

Why Don't Parents Own Their Children?

One ancient theory of the parental role is that parents own their children as property. The vast majority of classical liberal and libertarian thinkers have been against this theory ever since Locke published the Two Treatises in 1689. Locke spent the whole of the first treatise arguing against Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. Whereas Filmer had argued for unlimited parental (patriarchal) ownership of children, Locke argued that parental authority has limits and children have rights.

Locke faced a major problem in opposing parental ownership that dogged libertarian thought for centuries: Locke’s own theory of homesteading— if applied to determine the ownership of bodies— logically implies that parents own their children. The homesteading rule states that the rightful owner of a resource is the creator or first user of it. In the case of children, parents are the creators. Locke tried to resist the implication of homesteading theory that parents own children but did not have good arguments. So why don't parents own their children?

The core premise of the theory of parental ownership— that homesteading is the method of establishing ownership over bodies— is incorrect. Homesteading is not the only way to allocate property rights. Property rights are rightfully assigned to the person with the best objective link. For unowned physical objects, the best objective link is indeed demonstrated by first-use homesteading.

However, when it comes to human bodies, each individual has the best objective link for ownership of their own body. This is the objective rule used for establishing self ownership of bodies. Babies own themselves because nobody else has a better objective claim to own them. The best objective link is also not dependent on the capabilities of the baby. It doesn't matter if babies cannot yet argue a syllogism or advocate for their rights, they still have the objectively better claim to be the owners of their own body simply because they are the inhabitants of that body.

The fact that self ownership is the best objective link is irrefutable. Anybody who wanted to claim that their parents (or anyone else for that matter) have a better claim to their own body than they do would be contradicting themselves in the very process of arguing. This is because one must accept self ownership in order to use one's own body to argue, so one cannot refute it.

Furthermore, the theory of parental ownership is logically flawed because there is no way to account for an owned child becoming a self-owning adult. You cannot acquire ownership of yourself because an individual cannot homestead anything unless he already has self ownership. So how is a baby supposed to acquire self ownership? Self ownership must be presumed from the get-go as the only non-contradictory basis for libertarian ethics. All other libertarian principles, such as homesteading, depend on the assumption of self-ownership. There is no way to come up with a non-contradictory account of an individual starting as property and becoming a self owner because one cannot homestead oneself.

In short, parents do not own their children because humans cannot be owned. Humans are self owners.

A Response To Tom Woods on Parental Obligations

Among libertarians, there are four competing theories on the nature of parental obligations:

1. The Theory of Parental Ownership: parents own their children as property. This has been advocated by Benjamin Tucker and Jan Narveson.
2. The Theory of Parenting as Charity: parents have no enforceable obligations so any care they provide is akin to charity. This was advocated by Murray Rothbard, Harry Browne, Wendy McElroy, and many others.
3. The Theory of Parenting as Voluntary Social Contract: parents do have obligations, but only after they voluntarily take on this commitment by tacit contract with society at large. This has been advocated by Roderick Long and Steve Horwitz.
4. The Theory of Parental Responsibility: parenting is an enforceable obligation that arises by creation of peril through causal action by the parents. This last theory has been advocated by Nathaniel Branden, Doris Gordon, and Stephan Kinsella.

In Episode 733 of The Tom Woods Show, Tom Woods set out a brief defence of the principle of causal responsibility for parents. This makes Woods another libertarian who supports the theory of parental responsibility.

The theory of parental responsibility has radical implications. One clear implication is that abortion is incompatible with parental obligations. Therefore, if you accept the principle of enforceable parental obligations as a result of causal action, you must deny the legitimacy of abortion (at least in cases of consensual sex). Doris Gordon made this point effectively in her writing. Some libertarians have been willing to accept the principle but nonetheless refuse to accept the logical consequence on abortion- Nathaniel Branden and Stephan Kinsella are two examples of this position. In his podcast, Tom Woods not only set out the principle but also showed that he clearly understands and accepts the logical implication that abortion is indefensible.

I believe that the theory of parental responsibility is correct, so I am glad that Tom Woods agrees with this theory. For anyone who is interested, the theory has a history with roots in the work of Blackstone, Kant, Sidgwick, and others. The theory also has other radical implications which Woods might not be aware of. Here are just two as examples:

1. Both the mother and father are jointly and severally liable for their obligations (this is not true for other libertarian theories about parenting).
2. You cannot give up your parental obligations. This means that parents cannot legitimately absolve themselves of all obligation by giving up a child for adoption. It also means that gamete donation cannot be justified.

Circumcision: Chesterton's Fence vs. Self Ownership

There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away." To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it." - G. K. Chesterton

There are numerous problems with Chesterton's Fence argument, but the most important one is explained succinctly by a Reddit user:

The logic of Chesterton’s Fence literally says; "If you cannot defend my position, my position must be correct."

This is a fallacy. It is a sophist rhetorical strategy that attempts to transfer all responsibility for argumentation to the person you disagree with. It is not the responsibility of your opponent to make your argument for you.

I understand the motivation behind Chesterton's analogy. He was arguing against those who want to use the power of the State to coerce changes on everyone else. He was opposing the zealous midwits who act as if reality is completely malleable to coercive policy. These are people who have no regard for unintended consequences. But the correct principle to appeal to against such changes is not Chesterton's fence, it is private property rights.

Chesterton's fence argument only works if you ignore the existence of property rights, which solve the supposed problem. Who is the presumptuous busybody in Chesterton's analogy? Is it the person who sees a fence on the road and says "let us clear it away," or is it the person who says "I certainly won't let you clear it away"? It is impossible to say without knowing who rightfully owns the fence or the road.

The principle is that the property owner gets to decide what to do with his property. Obviously his choices are constrained by the requirement to respect other people's property and by any restrictive covenants or contracts that he's agreed to. But other than that, it is nobody else's business. In the case of both fences and roads, any change or continuity should be the choice of the rightful owner (and the State is not a rightful owner).

Neonatal Circumcision

The stupidity of using Chesterton's fence as a principle can be seen by applying it to the example of neonatal circumcision. In his book Circumcision A History of the World's Most Controversial Surgery, David L. Gollaher points out that the more you know about the history of circumcision the less sense it makes:

It is far easier to imagine the impulse behind Neolithic cave painting than to guess what inspired the ancients to cut their genitals or the genitals of their young.

I do not understand the motivation behind neonatal circumcision. I find the stated arguments for it to be absurdly unconvincing. It looks like sadism to me, but I don't claim to be able to see into the minds of parents who do this. Yet Chesterton's fence implies that until I can completely explain the institution and show why it exists, I should support it. Gollaher suggested a thought experiment about circumcision that applies the opposite principle to Chesterton's fence:

Imagine, for a moment, that circumcision had never caught on in America as a neonatal routine. In other words, suppose the United States were, say, like Norway. Next, imagine that a physician were to urge, in a talk at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics, doctors to begin operating on the genitals of all baby boys shortly after birth in order to achieve marginally lower incidence of urinary tract infections and perhaps some other diseases. Of course no physician would dream of proposing such a thing today. The threshold for demonstrated effectiveness in surgery, particularly surgery on infants, is far too high. Indeed, as the history of female circumcision suggests, if male circumcision were confined to developing nations, it would by now have emerged as an international cause celebre, stirring passionate opposition from feminists, physicians, politicians, and the global human rights community. If routine medical circumcision didn't exist today, no one would dare to invent it.

My objection to circumcision is based on the principle of self ownership- the most fundamental property right. Children are self owners and circumcision is an act of aggression against their bodies. As Walter Block and Patrick Testa put it:

neonatal circumcision is a violation of the right to bodily integrity, an overreach of religious freedom, and a coercive act on the most helpless of us all.

Applying the principle of self ownership also yields the compromise that circumcision is legitimate as a voluntary practice for consenting adults, just not as a coercive act performed on children. Here's Block and Testa again:

All we need do is not eliminate circumcision but rather postpone it. Instead of imposing it on helpless babies, too weak and immature to object to this invasive medical procedure, adults can choose for themselves whether or not to avail themselves of circumcision. Those convinced of its benefits would be free to do so; others need not.

A Critique of Nozick's Comments on Parental Obligations and Children's Rights

Robert Nozick made astute comments on one of the most important philosophical problems: what are the obligations of parents and the rights of children? Nozick's comments show that he understood the causal principle of parental responsibility. Yet at the same time, Nozick does not seem to have cared about trying to solve the problem of children's rights and some of his later comments on the topic are inane.

Nozick's insights into the philosophical problem of children's rights can be seen in his commentary on John Locke's theory of homesteading. Locke was a staunch opponent of the ancient theory of parental ownership of children. He spent the whole of the first treatise arguing against Robert Filmer's Patriarchia. Whereas Filmer had argued for unlimited parental (patriarchal) power over children, Locke argued that parental authority has limits and children have rights.

Locke faced a major problem in opposing parental ownership: his own theory of homesteading logically implied that parents own their children. The homesteading rule states that the rightful owner of a resource is the creator or first user of it. Who owns the body of a baby? Since parents create their children, this implies that parents own their children. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Nozick explains Locke's problem:

Locke must discuss Filmer in detail, not merely to clear the field of some alternative curious view, but to show why that view doesn't follow from elements of his own view, as one might suppose it did. … Ownership rights in what one has made would seem to follow from Locke's theory of property.

Locke tried to resist the implication of homesteading that parents own children. Although he was correct to deny parental ownership, unfortunately Locke's arguments for this conclusion were flawed. Locke's two arguments for why parents don't own their children were:

1. You can only own something that you create if you control and understand everything about the process of creating it.
2. God is the creator of all humans, therefore parents cannot be said to create their children.

Nozick showed that both these arguments fail. He pointed out that it is an impossible standard to hold that one can only own something one made if one completely understands it:

Surely most of what most of us do is to intervene in or originate processes whose complete operation we do not understand, yielding a result we could not completely design. (Who knows all of what physicists say is relevant to materials having the properties they do and to forces working as they do; and who knows what the physicists don’t know?) Yet in many such cases, Locke does want to say that we own what we produce.

Nozick also refuted Locke's fallback argument that God is the real creator of children, not parents, since this could be applied to everything and would therefore invalidate the whole concept of homesteading:

If the point is that God, far more than a child’s parents, is the maker of a child, this applies to many other things that Locke thinks can be owned (plants, nonhuman animals); and perhaps it applies to everything.

It is at this point in his commentary on Locke that Nozick makes two key insights into the problem of children's rights.

Nozick's First Insight: Locke Conceded That Children Are Ownable

Nozick shows that despite Locke's intention to defend and extend children's rights, Locke's argumentative strategy actually undermined them. By relying on the argument that it is really God who owns children, Locke was conceding the principle that the creator of a child owns that child, and merely shifting the debate as to who the rightful creator is. Locke was therefore unable to argue that human beings are not ownable. As Nozick explained:

Note that Locke is not claiming that children, because of something about their nature, cannot be owned by their parents even if these make them. He does not claim that something about people (who have not done anything unjust for which their lives are forfeit…) bars ownership in them by their maker, for he holds that God owns man by virtue of making him in all his exalted natural properties.

Nozick's Second Insight: Locke Denied Causal Parental Responsibility

Nozick pointed out that the arguments that Locke chose had the implication of denying that parents have enforceable obligations as a result of their causal action. If parents are not the cause of a child's existence, they cannot be held liable for a tort responsibility of putting the child in a state of peril as a result of creating them. Locke was forced to rely on a much weaker appeal to natural law to ground parental obligations. As Nozick explained:

Note that Locke’s strong denial that parents make their children, causing these beings, removes one base on which to found the responsibility of parents to care for their children. Thus Locke is reduced to saying that the law of nature requires such parental care (sect. 56), as a brute moral fact, apparently. But this leaves unexplained why it requires the care from the parents, and why it isn’t another case of someone’s receiving “the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to”

This short passage reveals a lot about Nozick:

1. He understood the argument for a causal principle of enforceable parental obligations
2. He realised that Locke's approach undermined this principle

What Did Nozick Argue About Parental Obligations?

Did Nozick agree that parents have enforceable parental obligations? Having identified the problem that Locke had created on this topic, Nozick avoided setting out his own position or defending it. One brief passing comment from his 1981 book Philosophical Explanations suggests he did think parents have such obligations:

The father, by abstaining from feeding the child, does cause and is responsible for its death, but not merely because he could have prevented it--he had a special responsibility to feed the child

This comment suggests that he disagreed with Rothbard's theory of the parent-child relationship (Nozick was influenced by Rothbard so almost certainly knew of what Rothbard had written on this). However, Nozick did not elaborate or provide any justification for this statement, he merely asserted it in passing. He does not specify whether he is arguing that the "special responsibility" of parents is an enforceable obligation or merely a duty of virtue. Most importantly, he does not explain whether he views this as a responsibility resulting from causal action or from voluntary agreement.

What Did Nozick Argue About Children's Rights?

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick set out four argumentative strategies one could use to argue against parental ownership of children:

1. Arguing that children are unownable
2. Arguing that homesteading does not apply to the case of assigning ownership of children
3. Arguing that parents are excluded from this specific property right
4. Arguing that parents are not really the creators of their children and therefore cannot homestead them

Nozick pointed out that Locke had prevented himself from arguing that children are unownable and had failed in his use of the other approaches. But Nozick declined to reveal his own solution to this problem or to explain where his own efforts at solving it faltered. He was content to give others the homework instead:

We have seen problems with Locke’s attempt to work 2, 3, and 4. The latter two being unpromising, someone of Lockean persuasion would have to work out a variant of 1 or 2.

Wasn't Nozick "someone of Lockean persuasion"? Why didn't he put forward his own answer? If he could not justify children's rights, why didn't he at least explain where he had got to and identify the challenges that he was unable to overcome?

In another passing comment in Philosophical Explanations Nozick did assert that children have rights:

even if the parents' only purpose was to produce a slave, and a slave's life is better than nonexistence, the offspring does not owe to his parents acquiescence in being enslaved. He is under no obligation to cooperate, he is not owned by his parents even though they made him. Once the child exists, it has certain rights that must be respected (and other rights it can assert when able) even if the parents' very purpose was to produce something without these rights. Nor do children owe to their parents whatever they would have conceded in bargaining before conception (supposing this had been possible) in order to come into existence.

But he declined to justify this assertion. Nozick never explained how or why children have rights. He never explained whether the rights of children are the same as those of adults.

In later years, the quality of Nozick's thoughts on the status of children seriously degraded. In stark contrast to his earlier insightful comments on how to refute parental ownership, The Examined Life (1989) contains half-baked and self-indulgent thoughts about children being an extension of their parents:

The children themselves form part of one’s substance … part of a wider identity you have.

The majority of his chapter on Parents and Children in that book is a series of speculations about ways he thinks the government could regulate inheritance laws to achieve various ends such as preventing wealth inequality. What a disappointment compared to his commentary on Locke.

Maybe Nozick Just Didn't Care

It is clear what John Locke was trying to say in his writings on children. He argued for children's rights. He argued for limiting the authority of parents. He argued against the idea that parents own their children. Locke made significant errors along the way, and Nozick's commentary on those errors is clever.

But what was Nozick trying to say? His own words in Anarchy, State, and Utopia on how he thought about philosophy are quite revealing:

One view about how to write a philosophy book holds that an author should think through all of the details of the view he presents, and its problems, polishing and refining his view to present to the world a finished, complete, and elegant whole. This is not my view. At any rate, I believe that there also is a place and a function in our ongoing intellectual life for a less complete work, containing unfinished presentations, conjectures, open questions and problems, leads, side connections, as well as a main line of argument. There is room for words on subjects other than last words.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe described the effect of this attitude on Nozick's writing:

The book was a series of dozens of disparate or loosely jointed arguments, conjectures, puzzles, counterexamples, experiments, paradoxes, surprising turns, startling twists, intellectual flashes, and philosophical razzle-dazzle

The result of his approach is that Nozick's work reads like a kind of intellectual showboating. He didn't seem to view it as his responsibility to contribute to solving the ethical problem of children's rights and parental obligations. Rather, it reads as if Nozick's exploration of questions concerning children's rights is just a game of making clever points, without trying to get to any resolution.

Hoppe's assessment of Nozick's writing on libertarianism could equally be applied to Nozick's comments on the ethics of parents and children:

Nozick did not claim that his libertarian conclusions proved anything. Even though one would think that ethics is--and must be--an eminently practical intellectual subject, Nozick did not claim that his ethical "explorations" had any practical implications. … He did not insist that his libertarian conclusions were correct and, for instance, socialist conclusions were false and accordingly demand their instant practical implementation … Rather, Nozick's libertarianism was, and claimed to be, no more than just an interesting thought. He did not mean to do any real harm to the ideas of his socialist opponents. He only wanted to throw an interesting idea into the democratic open-ended intellectual debate, while everything real, tangible, and physical could remain unchanged and everyone could go on with his life and thoughts as before.

A Response To Kerry Baldwin on Fetal Self Ownership

Whilst doing research for a forthcoming book about libertarianism and parental obligations, I was interested to come across the work of Kerry Baldwin. This post is a response to the ideas that Baldwin put forward in her two-part podcast series on libertarianism, abortion, and fetal self-ownership as well as her debate with Walter Block on evictionism.

Abortion

On this blog, I have written about how support for abortion has corrupted libertarian theory. Baldwin makes an excellent point in this regard. She argues that the belief that abortion is legitimate undermines the principle of self ownership. The logical implication of assuming that abortion is valid is that individuals only have rights if their mother decides to grant them rights. As Baldwin puts it, this is not a theory of self ownership, it is a theory of "matriarchy".

In a recent post, I argued that the theory of acquired rights violates Hoppe's specificity principle. Although she used different terms and argued it a little differently, Baldwin made a very similar point in her series on fetal self ownership.

In her debate with Walter Block, Baldwin made an important objection to Block's evictionism. She pointed out that Block's characterisation of abortion as "eviction plus killing" is not accurate. As she noted, in fact most abortions are a process comprised of "killing plus removal of a dead body". This objection applies to Judith Jarvis Thomson's defence of abortion too, which also relies on the idea that abortion is legitimate because it can be categorised as an example of letting die not killing.

If Block is concerned to allow eviction but deny killing as he says, the logical consequence would be for him to argue that only extractive abortions (for example, hysterotomy) are legitimate and all non-extractive abortions are illegitimate according to evictionism. Extractive abortions are arguably examples of letting die, not killing, which is central to Block's justification. Yet Block seems entirely uninterested in such details. He provided no defence to Baldwin's objection in the debate, saying "I don't know as much about this as she does so I defer to what she said".

Parental Obligations

Baldwin is one of the few libertarians who argue that parents do have enforceable obligations towards their children as a result of their own causal actions. She argues that since pregnancy is a known possible outcome of consensual sex, parents have responsibility for the consequences of their actions and therefore they have obligations towards the child. This argument is of great interest to me, since I believe that among the competing libertarian views about parental obligations, only the principle of causal responsibility is correct. It seems that Baldwin might accept this principle.

However, Baldwin seems to have a much narrower definition of parental obligations. If I understand her correctly, she holds that a mother has the obligation to provide life support (gestation) during the period of non-viability of a fetus, and if the baby is unwanted then the mother also has the obligation to find a suitable caregiver once the baby is born.

If parents have an obligation to their children because they have responsibility for the consequences of their actions (in cases of consensual sex), then the obligation is far greater than Baldwin seems to accept. Children have a rightful claim against their parents not only for life support during pregnancy (as Baldwin argues), but also for whatever else is necessary to get the child out of peril and to a position of safety and self-sufficiency. This involves raising the child (and all that this entails) to the independence and self-sufficiency of adulthood.

According to this principle, parental obligations apply to both the mother and the father and both are jointly and severally liable towards the child, since both are responsible for putting the child in a state of peril as a result of creating the child. Baldwin makes the case for some limited enforceable obligations of the mother, but it is not clear to me whether she thinks that fathers have enforceable parental obligations or what these are.

Baldwin argues that it is a legitimate choice to give up a child for adoption. She emphasises that "there are many good reasons for not wanting to have a child". There are some cases in which parents do not have obligations, such as pregnancy resulting from rape. However, apart from those exceptions, you cannot legitimately give up parental obligations.

Parents who place a child in peril have a tort liability until that child is out of peril. Adoption is at best a delegation of this obligation, but even then the parents can never fully rid themselves of the legitimate claim that the child has on them (since it is not their claim to give up or nullify). It may be beneficial to support the institution of adoption for purely pragmatic reasons (making the best of a bad situation). Even if adoption should be supported for the sake of children, it is not a legitimate choice for the parents in terms of libertarian theory.

Finally, Baldwin seems to argue that the nature of pregnancy is significant for the role of women within libertarian theory, although it is not clear to me exactly what her argument is. She likens pregnancy to an act of production, with the mothers being "the producers of new self owners". Perhaps she is advocating some form of the theory of gestationalism (the idea that gestation is the primary basis for parental rights and obligations). This idea is not compatible with her support for children as self owners from conception because the unborn self owner already exists during gestation. Gestation is not an act of production since it does not contribute to the existence of the child. Rather, gestation is the first form of nurturing for an already existent unborn child that is developing. This idea of the mother as the "producer" is therefore incompatible with inherent self ownership.

Although I have outlined some disagreements, Baldwin is one of the few libertarians making philosophical arguments for inherent rights and for parental obligations and I appreciate her work.

Three Questions Philosophers Do Not Want To Answer About Parenting

Why are most books on the ethics of parenting so boring? Family life is a topic that touches everyone, so this is one area where philosophy could engage with highly relevant moral concerns. Instead, the vast majority of books on the philosophy of the family are horribly dull.

There are many reasons for this blandness, but one reason is that the authors are engaged in strategic omission. They are skirting around a number of contentious ethical questions related to the family. When your writing is hampered by a list of things that you must avoid discussing, it makes your book boring and waffly because you (deliberately) don't get to the point. Instead, you spend a lot of time on uncontentious issues that are far less relevant to everyday life.

The topics that philosophers of the family studiously avoid discussing have two characteristics:

1. They are widely accepted parental practices.
2. They are ethically indefensible.

Here are three questions about topics that share these characteristics and so are strategically omitted by philosophers writing on the family:

1. Is corporal punishment a legitimate practice?
2. Is circumcision a legitimate practice?
3. Is abortion a legitimate practice?

Open any book that claims to be about the ethics of parenting (or any variation on this general theme) and you will probably not even find these topics discussed. Search a digital version of the book for these words and you usually find nothing. Of the three topics, abortion is sometimes mentioned briefly, but even then it is usually only to state that the ethics of this practice are outside the scope of the book.

Philosophers who have written on the topic of abortion have not addressed it from the perspective of the ethics of parenting, but rather from the perspective of the ethics of action towards a stranger who may be a trespasser or aggressor. They don't think of the topic as belonging to the philosophy of the family since they do not even view abortion as an action of a parent.

All three practices- corporal punishment, circumcision, and abortion- constitute acts of aggression by parents that violate the rights of their children. Philosophers who agree with this statement prefer to avoid having to state it openly or defend it. Philosophers who disagree with the statement are also apparently reluctant to defend their views.

In his book Corporal Punishment: A Philosophical Assessment, Patrick Lenta discusses the silence of philosophers on this topic:

with very few exceptions philosophers have not engaged in a sustained moral assessment of the corporal punishment of children. … It is reasonable to infer from what we know about the near-ubiquity of corporal punishment that most philosophers will have been subjected to it and many will have resorted to it. This in itself may explain some philosophers’ reticence about confronting the practice. … For some who have experienced it, corporal punishment may be too personally disturbing, too deeply and troublingly a constituent of their psyches, to be confronted directly. …Loyalty towards one’s care-givers and defensiveness about one’s own use of corporal punishment as a care-giver, as well as, and perhaps more importantly, the weight of historical support for it, may make the practice appear natural and not in need of moral justification.

Lenta's hypothesis could equally apply to the silence of philosophers on circumcision and, with minor differences, on abortion. Walter Block and Patrick Testa remark on the lack of ethical debate about circumcision:

The reality of the debate on neonatal circumcision is that it hardly exists at all. … Even for many of those who disdain violence and the struggle to retain archaic social norms, it is almost as if circumcision is a topic off-limits to debate—perhaps out of denial or an appealing sense of conformity. But underneath the guise of culture, neonatal circumcision is a violation of the right to bodily integrity, an overreach of religious freedom, and a coercive act on the most helpless of us all.

In avoiding discussing these issues, philosophers of the family are conforming to regnant intellectual taboos. They understand which topics are not supposed to be mentioned and they comply. This is cowardice and an abdication of the most basic responsibility of a philosopher. In The Silent Subject: Reflections on the Unborn in American Culture, Brad Stetson describes how the taboo around the topic of abortion works:

Civilized and thoughtful people are expected to step around the violent death of the unborn accomplished by every abortion. To mention it in dialogue or debate is to solicit angry glares, impatient sighs and apparently learned expressions of skepticism about knowing when "human life begins." … There is no such thing, in the agora of public opinion, as being compassionate to the unborn. Not only are they not accorded the legal status of persons, but they are not even admitted into public discourse as legitimate objects of concern.

For anyone not interested in the ethics of parenting, if is fine to choose not to engage in these topics. But if you write a book about the ethics of parent-child relationships and avoid discussing these issues, you are engaging in strategic omission. Any practice that is widely accepted yet ethically questionable is exactly what philosophers of the family should discuss. Even if such topics are not the central focus of their books, they should at least spend a couple of paragraphs explaining why they think these practices are either justified or not justified according to their understanding of the ethics of parent-child relationships.

Here are links to my posts about abortion, corporal punishment, and circumcision.

I highlighted these three topics because they are longstanding practices and therefore even books about the ethics of the family written some years ago should have addressed them. There are many other parenting practices that are widely accepted and ethically unjustifiable which have become prevalent more recently, for example:

• The use of psychotropic drugs on children
• The use of puberty blocking drugs on children
• sex-change surgeries undertaken on children.

A Response To Bob Murphy On Children in Libertarian Law

In Episode 182 of his podcast, Bob Murphy put forward a proposal for how children should be treated in libertarian law. This post is a response to his proposal.

Rothbard's Theory of Parental Ownership

As a background to the proposal, Murphy outlines some disagreements or concerns that he has with the ideas on the parent-child relationship set out by Rothbard in The Ethics of Liberty.

Murphy explains that he always found Rothbard's account of limited parental ownership of children to be unsatisfactory and "loosey-goosey" in its formulation. He mentions a variation of this parental ownership idea by Walter Block, who attempted to ground certain parental obligations in the rules of homesteading. Although Murphy is not convinced by this version either, he does think that some better grounding of the parent-child relationship in libertarian legal theory is needed.

Rothbard's Denial of Parental Obligations

In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard argued that parents do not have enforceable obligations towards their children:

the parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or educate his children, since such obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon the parent and depriving the parent of his rights.

It is not clear to me whether Murphy agrees with this line of argument, but he does make it clear that he understands why Rothbard is concerned to avoid any principle that could justify positive obligations. Here's how Murphy puts it in the podcast:

There is a definite plausibility to what Rothbard is saying because once you open that door so that other people could have claims upon you even though you don't have a contractual arrangement with them, then it's hard to stop that principle.

Rothbard's Limits on Parental Authority

Murphy also objects to Rothbard's argument that parents cannot exercise authority over a child if the child chooses to run away. Murphy points out that this implies that if a stranger manages to persuade a child to go with them willingly (for example by bribing them with candy), the parent would just have to let the child leave.

Murphy's Proposal

Murphy suggests that the relationship between a parent and a child should be considered that of a trust, whereby:

• The child is the beneficiary of the trust, receiving parental care and guardianship as the benefit.
• The parent is the trustee (the person entrusted with responsibility for administering the trust) who provides parental care and guardianship to the child as an obligation of the role of trustee.
• The trustor (the person responsible for defining the terms of the trust) is the future adult that the child will become. The parents as trustees must do their best to imagine what the future adult-child would want them to do and act on those wishes.

A Response To Murphy

I agree with Murphy that Rothbard's theory of parental ownership is flawed. Here is a detailed critique. Like Murphy, I also disagree with Walter Block's ideas about homesteading children. Contrary to Block, children are not homesteadable property and parents are not "free to dump out" a child that they do not want. Parents cannot legitimately give up parental obligations.

What about Murphy's trust proposal? What Murphy is doing by conceptualising the parent-child relationship as a trust is asserting that parents have obligations and also that they have authority. If parents are trustees, then this implies that they have certain enforceable obligations. It also implies that they have authority in order to carry out their responsibility as trustees.

But why should a parent act as a trustee? In commercial trusts, the responsibilities of a trustee are governed by contract. It is clear why the trustee must fulfil this role, since he contracted to do so. Yet the analogy breaks down in applying this model to the family since the parent did not sign a contract (and the child is too young to consent to contracts anyway). So what obliges the parent to fulfil his duty? And what happens if a parent does not fulfil his duty? Does he have an enforceable obligation? Murphy does not say. He has not provided any grounding for the parenting-as-trust metaphor. He has just asserted it.

Similarly, why should one accept that a parent has the authority over a child to act paternalistically towards them? Since libertarianism is incompatible with paternalism in general, what makes paternalism justifiable towards a child? And why is it that a parent has authority to act paternalistically but others do not? Again, Murphy uses the concept of the trust as a framework, but does not provide a reason why this should be accepted.

Parents Have Enforceable Obligations

What is missing from Murphy's critique of Rothbard is for Murphy to take a view on whether parents have enforceable obligations and to explain why. One of Rothbard's great merits was a consistency that came from his willingness to accept the logical consequences of his ideas. However, in the case of parent-child relationship, Rothbard doggedly stuck to an idea that is simply wrong: the notion that parents do not have enforceable obligations. This insistence led to absurd conclusions, such as the legitimacy of starving a child to death. As I have argued elsewhere, the denial of parental obligations has been an enormous error in libertarian thinking and is by no means a requirement of libertarian theory.

Parents have enforceable obligations towards their children because they have causal responsibility for placing the children in a state of peril as a consequence of having created them. This is the causal theory of parental responsibility. Among the competing libertarian theories of the parent-child relationship, this is the only one that provides a clear grounding both for parental obligation and parental authority.

To illustrate the concept of causal responsibility for the creation of peril, imagine I decide to create an enormous "burning man" style bonfire in my garden. The flames begin to rage out of control, which creates a risk to the neighbourhood at large. If I find the whole situation is not as entertaining as I wished and instead is getting stressful, can I legitimately just walk off and do something different instead? Or do I have a positive obligation to take whatever actions are necessary to bring the fire under control? Despite the fact that the fire has not yet damaged anyone else's property, and despite the fact that I have no contract with my neighbours pre-arranging what must be done in the event of fires, I still have a strict liability for the consequences of my own dangerous acts and I am responsible for preventing the danger from turning into harm. This means that I have an enforceable positive obligation by tort (not contract) to control the fires that I start.

It is the actions of the parents themselves (regardless of intent) that grounds their obligation towards the child. Similarly, it is the obligation to relieve the child from peril that gives the parent authority to act on that obligation, and also sets clear limits for that authority.

Parental Obligation Does Not Imply General Welfare

Murphy seems to share the concern that Rothbard had that to accept parental obligations would open the door to accepting generalised obligations of welfare. Again, on this point Rothbard was unfortunately just wrong. There is nothing in libertarian theory that prevents an acceptance of tort liability for one's actions. Accepting that you are responsible for the consequences of your own actions does not entail a responsibility for humanity at large, nor does it imply responsibility for anyone at all except those directly impacted by the consequences of your actions.

The Principle of Parental Responsibility is Libertarian

Although still a minority position among libertarians, the principle of parental responsibility has the advantage not only of being correct but also of leading to all the reasonable conclusions that Murphy would expect from a theory of the parent-child relationship. Stephan Kinsella has advocated this principle in his book Legal Foundations of a Free Society. In the past, the principle was expressed by libertarians such as Doris Gordon and Nathaniel Branden (although Branden did not accept all the logical consequences). It has been set out by various philosophers as far back as the eighteenth century. I hope Bob Murphy becomes another libertarian advocate of this principle.

The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppe's Specificity Principle

Libertarians disagree about whether rights are inherent or acquired. In order to judge which theory of rights is valid, both theories must be evaluated against libertarian meta-ethical principles.

A fundamental principle of libertarian meta-ethics is that all property rights must be specific to individuals at definite points in time. This means that any property rule must provide a way to clearly identify the particular individual who has a property right and also provide a way to clearly identify the points in time when this right is valid. Let's call this The Specificity Principle.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe identified this principle. It is one of the meta-ethical principles of his framework of Argumentation Ethics. All the meta-ethical principles put forward by Hoppe in this framework have two key features:

1. The principle must be accepted in argument, since it is logically derived from the act of argument itself and therefore is undeniable without contradiction:
2. Any proposed property right is demonstrably unworkable a priori unless it conforms to the principle.

Hoppe showed how both these characteristics apply to the specificity principle:

Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an indeterminate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one wants to do. Rather, insofar as a person finds himself alone, he must be able to act, to use, produce, consume goods straightaway, prior to any agreement with people who are simply not around yet (and perhaps never will be). And insofar as a person finds himself in the company of others and there is conflict over how to use a given scarce resource, he must be able to resolve the problem at a definite point in time with a definite number of people instead of having to wait unspecified periods of time for unspecified numbers of people. Simply in order to survive, then, which is a prerequisite to arguing in favor of or against anything, property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of people concerned. Rather, they must necessarily be thought of as originating through acting at definite points in time for definite acting individuals.

- Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism

The theory of acquired rights is not specific about when a child becomes a self owner

According to the theory of acquired rights, humans only have rights when they possess some characteristic or ability that confers rights-worthiness. However, there is no consensus on what exactly the characteristic or capability is. This fails to comply with the specificity principle because the theory of acquired rights is not specific about when a child becomes a self owner.

The specificity principle states that one must be able to point to a specific owner of a property right at any given time. Yet the theory of acquired rights does not do this. Almost all leading proponents of the theory of acquired rights acknowledge that their theory is ambiguous about when an individual becomes a self owner.

The ambiguity is shown in the way that they defend abortion. Their argument is:

1. Some abortions are not murder (because the child is not a self owner).
2. Some abortions are murder (because the child is a self owner).
3. There is not a clear boundary between these two categories.
4. In any disputed case, someone will have to determine whether or not an abortion is justified (the theory of acquired rights does not provide an objective basis to answer this a priori).
5. Therefore abortion is justified, unless someone determines that it is not.

This vagueness is not how rights work. A valid theory of rights is supposed to be deducible by the agents on the ground who are making moral decisions. Yet advocates of the theory of acquired rights are quite content to acknowledge that they don't know when a child becomes a self owner. Here are some examples.

Tibor Machan openly admitted that he doesn't know when an individual becomes "a human being":

Finally, something more must be said about the grey area of borderline cases. The best solution to this problem is probably to provide a forum for debate. Given the seriousness of what is at stake, the courts—the judicial system—would seem to be the appropriate forum. When someone believes that a planned abortion could involve the killing of a human being—for example, at a very late stage of pregnancy—it might be appropriate to ask for a hearing on the matter.

-The Morality of Non-Interference by Tibor Machan

Judith Jarvis Thompson, author of the most influential philosophical defence of abortion, openly conceded that some abortions are unjustifiable killings but failed to identify what determined the validity of any particular case. She defended abortion but abdicated all responsibility for providing a clear moral rule by breezily saying that there is "room for much discussion":

there are some cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother’s body, and therefore some cases in which abortion is unjust killing. There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, if any. At any rate the argument certainly does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing.

-A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson

Stephan Kinsella simply assumes that a zygote cannot have rights but that an unborn child in late pregnancy does have rights, but gives no rule as to how to determine when rights acquisition occurs:

it seems obvious to me that a one-day old zygote has no rights yet, even though it is a potential human person, and biologically a “human life.”It also seems obvious to me that infants have rights, so that infanticide is murder. And that there is little difference between late-term abortion and infanticide

- Legal Foundations of a Free Society by Stephan Kinsella

To make a valid property rule, you have to specify which individual holds the property right and identify the points in time when he has these rights. If you don't specify these things, you've done it wrong and your property rule is invalid. This is the case with the theory of acquired rights. The property rule "children come to own themselves at some point before birth but it is unclear when" is a badly-formulated and invalid property rule.

Advocates of the theory of acquired rights sometimes resort to the defence that it is not their fault that the start of personhood or rights is unspecific, this is merely a reflection of the nature of things. They argue that fetuses become rights-bearing individuals at some point, but there is no way to provide a clear cutoff since it is a gradual process that cannot be made into a binary in a non-arbitrary way. Therefore it is impossible to be specific about when the child becomes a self owner.

This is not true. The ambiguity in this theory is not imposed by nature, it is chosen. At least for some advocates, the choice seems to be the result of motivated reasoning. Whatever the reason, such ambiguity is objectively unnecessary since there is a valid formulation of rights theory that is unambiguous. It is possible to identify an objective point at which a child becomes a self owner. The theory of inherent rights does this.

The Theory of Inherent Rights Conforms To The Specificity Principle

According to the theory of inherent rights, individuals have rights from the moment they come into existence. Unlike the theory of acquired rights, there is no vague and unspecified transition between a parent "owning" a child and a child becoming a self owner. Every individual is a self owner from the moment he comes into existence without ambiguity.

The theory of inherent rights provides an objective and definite temporal start to rights, and therefore is in compliance with Hoppe's specificity principle. The objective start is conception. As the philosopher Richard Werner pointed out, there is a non-arbitrary difference between two gametes prior to conception and a zygote after conception:

unlike the fetus immediately prior to birth and the baby immediately afterward, there is a significant and important difference between the ovum or sperm immediately before fertilization and the zygote immediately afterward. Given the proper environment the embryo, qua itself, is a growing developing organism. All things being equal, the zygote will grow into a person. On the other hand, the ovum or sperm qua itself is neither growing nor developing no matter what sort of environment one should find it, or put it into. A gamete will not, by itself, grow into anything other than what it already is— a gamete. In this sense it is inert and, thereby, nonhuman. A necessary condition of the ovum becoming human is that it begin to grow and develop into a person, that it be fertilized by a sperm cell. Otherwise, it remains inert never developing or growing into anything whatever and, as such, is no more a human being than is one of my red blood cells. Admittedly an acorn is not an oak, nor is an ovum or sperm cell human, but an acorn germinated in the soil is indeed an oak and so is the impregnated ovum a human.

- Abortion The Moral Status of the Unborn by Richard Werner

Of the competing libertarian rights theories, only the theory of inherent rights is consistent with libertarian meta-ethical principles. Therefore rights are inherent, not acquired.

All Rights Are Human Rights and All Human Rights Are Property Rights

Parents who want to act ethically need to have a set of philosophical principles. They need principles to understand their role and to guide their actions towards their children. Here are some key philosophical questions that parents need answers for:

1. Do parents have enforceable obligations towards their children? Why?
2. Are children rights-bearing individuals (i.e. self owners)? Why?
3. Do parents have authority over their children? Why?

Libertarian philosophy, built on classical liberalism and the Enlightenment, ought to be able to provide parents with a clear framework to answer all these questions. However, for whatever reason, addressing questions related to children and the family has been the weakest aspect of libertarian thought. Attempts to apply libertarian theory to the family have been fraught with contradictions and sometimes justly subject to ridicule. This is strange, since it did not have to be this way.

Libertarianism can provide a coherent moral framework for parents. It can do this through the concept of rights. A core insight of the libertarian theory of rights is that all rights are human rights and all human rights are property rights.

The concept of property rights is the foundation of ethics. The root of all conflict is the fundamental problem of scarcity: in the nature of our universe, scarcity is unavoidable and therefore conflict over scarce things is always a possibility. Ethics enables peaceful cooperation within our universe of scarce resources through the mechanism of objective property rights. The function of property is to prevent conflict by assigning exclusive rights over scarce resources. Property rights are therefore necessary to make conflict-free interaction possible. You cannot have ethics without property rights. You cannot have a peaceful society without objective property rights.

Since property rights govern who can legitimately control scarce things, and human beings themselves are scarce, property rights also apply to human beings. Another great libertarian insight is that humans are self owners: each individual is the rightful owner of his body since he has the best objective claim to ownership. The implications of this insight for adults have been well established in libertarian thought, but there has always been a difficulty in applying the principles to family situations. Are children self owners? If so, what gives parents authority over children? If parents are self owners, how can children have a claim against their parents for obligations towards them?

In attempting to answer these questions, libertarians are divided among competing theories of the nature of parental obligations and competing theories of the nature of children's rights. My project on this blog is to assess these competing theories and identify which among them is both compatible with libertarian principles and indisputable in argument.

This project immediately gives rise to two questions:

1. How can one assess competing ethical theories? Any such assessment presumes some kind of meta-ethical rules for determining what makes an ethical theory valid. What should those meta-ethical rules be and why should anyone accept them?
2. Why should anyone accept any ethical principles relating to the family anyway, given Hume's insight that you cannot get an ought from an is.

These questions will be the subject of future posts.

Consequentialist Arguments Against Inherent Rights

In previous articles I have addressed two arguments against inherent rights: the presumption that inherent rights must be based on religious dogma and variations on the argument from incredulity. This article addresses consequentialist arguments against inherent rights.

All consequentialist arguments against inherent rights are variations on the following core argument: If it is true that individuals have inherent rights, I/we won't be able to do certain things that I/we deem very important. Therefore individuals do not have inherent rights.

I find this argument such a shameless case of motivated reasoning that I am surprised by how many people are willing to make it. Yet it can be seen on blatant display in consequentialist arguments against inherent rights. There are two main variants:

1. Recognising inherent rights would limit population control, therefore individuals don't have inherent rights
2. Recognising inherent rights would prevent abortion, therefore individuals don't have inherent rights

The Population Control Argument

The population control argument against inherent rights is essentially this:

1. Population control is important/necessary.
2. We need to use infanticide for population control.
3. Infanticide is not possible if rights are recognised as inherent.
4. Therefore rights are not inherent.

Jan Narveson makes the argument that it is "not reasonable" to recognise the inherent rights of "all and sundry newborns" because infanticide may be required for population control:

infanticide has been a recognized social practice in many human societies, not only in much earlier times but in a few societies even now. Infanticide as a method of population control has been frequent, and as a sort of rough eugenic practice perhaps even more so… whatever one’s instinctive reaction to the contemplation of infanticide may be, it is not a reflection of a universal human feeling, even in the sense of one that has been typical in every culture and society. This suggests that the circumstances of those societies have something to do with it. And that seems to me to be as it should be. In a society of very limited resources, where life is harsh, people cannot afford to devote those resources to the sickly or lame; in a society where the food supply is just equal to the population as is, expansion of population is everyone’s enemy. It is not reasonable to grant strong positive rights to life to all and sundry newborns in such circumstances. - Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea

In this excerpt, Narveson is attempting to bolster his consequentialist case for infanticide with a fallacious argument from authority, suggesting that infanticide should be considered legitimate since it has been a recognized social practice in many human societies. It is an appeal to social proof.

As an advocate of the theory of acquired rights, Peter Singer makes numerous arguments against inherent rights. Among these, he includes the consequentialist argument about population control. Like Narveson, Singer is also fan of the "other people do it" argument for infanticide. He invokes the argument from authority by noting that highly-regarded ancient philosophers justified infanticide on grounds of population control:

Not to kill a deformed or sickly infant was often regarded as wrong, and infanticide was probably the first, and in several societies the only, form of population control. We might think that we are more 'civilized' than these 'primitive' peoples, but it is not easy to feel confident that we are more civilized than the best Greek and Roman moralists, nor than the highly sophisticated civilizations of China and Japan. In ancient Greece, it was not just the Spartans who exposed their infants on hillsides: both Plato and Aristotle recommended the killing of deformed infants. Romans like Seneca, whose compassionate moral sense strikes the modern reader (or me, anyway) as superior to that of the early and mediaeval Christian writers, also thought infanticide the natural and humane solution to the problem posed by sick and deformed babies. The change in Western attitudes to infanticide since Roman times is, like the doctrine of the sanctity of human life of which it is a part, a product of Christianity. Perhaps it is now possible to think about these issues without assuming the Christian moral framework that has, for so long, prevented any fundamental reassessment. - Peter Singer, Practical Ethics

Singer combines both the population control argument and the abortion argument against inherent rights. He takes it as given that population control is necessary and argues that abortion is just as valid as any other method:

to argue against abortion on the grounds that it prevents beings of high intrinsic value coming into the world is implicitly to condemn practices that reduce the future human population: contraception, whether by 'artificial' means or by 'natural' means such as abstinence on days when the woman is likely to be fertile, and also celibacy. This argument does not provide any reason for thinking abortion worse than any other means of population control. If the world is already overpopulated, the argument provides no reason at all against abortion.

Singer is attacking a straw man of the argument for inherent rights. Abortion is not wrong because "it prevents beings of high intrinsic value coming into the world", it is wrong because it involves killing a rights-bearing individual who is already in the world. Individuals already exist inside the womb. When a baby is born it is changing location, not coming into existence.

Singer's consequentialist argument for infanticide via abortion comes down to this:

1. Population control is necessary
2. Everyone accepts some forms of population control as legitimate (e.g. contraception, abstinence, and celibacy).
3. Abortion is just another form of population control.
4. Therefore abortion is legitimate.
5. Abortion is incompatible with inherent rights.
6. Therefore rights cannot be inherent.

There is an obvious flaw in this argument. Just because contraception, abstinence, and celibacy prevent population growth and are morally legitimate practices, this does not imply that any practice that prevents population increase is morally legitimate. Shooting people at random prevents population growth; Singer would not apply the same logic to argue that this must also be legitimate.

Paul Ehrlich, loser of the Simon–Ehrlich wager, was responsible for an influential 1968 book The Population Bomb. Alongside its inaccurate assertions and failed predictions, the book called for "compulsory birth regulation" in pursuit of population control. Ehrlich saw abortion as a legitimate tool of population control and expressed outrage that the UN was not yet encouraging it at the time:

Abortion is a highly effective weapon in the armory of population control. It is condemned by many family planning groups, which are notorious for pussyfooting about methodology, despite their beginning 60 years ago as revolutionary social pioneers. The United Nations, for instance, does not include abortion in family planning. Quite the contrary, the U.N. justifies family planning as a method of combating abortion!

Ehrlich's consequentialist argument for abortion is that unwanted children will only lead miserable lives if allowed to live and will also contribute to the destruction of humanity, therefore it is good to kill them:

in many cases abortion is much more desirable than childbirth. Above all, biologists must take the side of the hungry billions of living human beings today and tomorrow, not the side of potential human beings. Remember, unless their numbers are limited, if those potential human beings are born, they will at best lead miserable lives and die young. We cannot permit the destruction of humanity to be abetted by a doctrine conceived in total ignorance of the biological facts of life.

Ehrlich's book was extremely influential, for example in the development of China's one child policy between 1979 and 2015. The one child policy included forced abortions.

The population control argument is based on false premises. The looming demographic problem is not population growth but population collapse. However, even if one were to accept the incorrect premise that population control is good or necessary, it simply does not follow that killing babies is ethically valid.

Infanticide is not required to prevent the creation of children. Preventing the creation of children is not something that requires action, on the contrary, it is the result of inaction. Children do not just show up, they are created by the actions of the man and woman- the mother and father- who make their gametes available for fusion. If you make your gametes available for fusion, you are responsible for the consequences of your actions. If you don't want to create children, don't make your gametes available for fusion.

When a man and woman create a child, they have put a child in a state of peril. The fact that they did not intend to create the child does not remove them from moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions. The fact that they cannot afford the consequences of their actions does not remove them from moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions. It may be unwise for some people to have children, but this fact does not justify denying rights to children who have nonetheless been created. It does not justify any form of infanticide. The population control argument against inherent rights is morally absurd.

The Abortion Argument

The use of motivated reasoning is even more blatant when it comes to arguing against inherent rights on consequentialist grounds relating to abortion. As a reminder, the basic form of all consequentialist arguments against inherent rights is this: If it is true that individuals have inherent rights, I/we won't be able to do certain things that I/we deem very important. Therefore individuals do not have inherent rights. The abortion argument tracks this format exactly. Laura Purdy set out the argument bluntly when she argued simply that unborn children cannot have rights because it would prevent abortions:

Consider the consequences for women if society grants equal rights to fetuses: most abortions would unjustifiably be prohibited. In general, then, despite the advantages of adopting more inclusive standards, we cannot be blind to the possibly overridingly bad consequences of doing so. -Laura M. Purdy, In Their Best Interest? The Case Against Equal Rights for Children

Mary Ann Warren provided a more detailed exposition of this argument against inherent rights:

we need to be careful not to burden human moral agents with obligations that they cannot possibly fulfill, except at unacceptably great cost to their own well-being and that of those they care about. Women often cannot complete unwanted pregnancies, except at intolerable mental, physical, and economic cost to themselves and their families. And heterosexual intercourse is too important a part of the social lives of most men and women to be reserved for times when pregnancy is an acceptable outcome. - Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” in Ethics in Practice, ed. Hugh LaFolette

Warren's argument against inherent rights is essentially:

1. Men and women need to be able to have heterosexual sex without encountering the risk of having to raise a child as a result.
2. The removal of this risk requires abortion to be available.
3. Abortion is not compatible with inherent rights.
4. Therefore inherent rights are invalid.

There is an utter contempt for the lives of children behind all consequentialist arguments against inherent rights. This contempt is often somewhat disguised, but in some cases it is stated openly. Sharon Presley and Robert Cooke argued that a pregnant woman has the right to insist not merely on removal of the unborn child but also on the killing of it, because letting the child live would have "psychological significance" for the woman. These "libertarians" make an extraordinarily aggressive and bloodthirsty argument:

If the fetus is removed and raised independently, as Block suggests, the woman is still the biological mother with all the psychological significance that implies… But, we maintain, a woman's right to self-determination includes the right to refuse to bear a child as long as that choice is still physically open to her… If a woman has a right to abort a fetus at any point prior to birth, this also implies the right to terminate the life of the fetus as well. Abortion is not a discrete act; it is an ongoing process that begins within the woman's body and continues outside it. If she has a right to the procedure of abortion, she has a right to the entire procedure otherwise the so-called right is meaningless. Since the purpose of abortion is not just to terminate the pregnancy but to avoid bearing the child, what is necessary is not just the removal of the fetus (otherwise she could just bring it to term and give it up for adoption), but its death.  - Sharon Presley & Robert Cooke, The Right To Abortion: A Libertarian Defence

Presley and Cooke are asserting that unwanted children must die to satisfy the psychological needs of their mothers. The reprehensible contempt for the lives of children necessary to make such an argument is clear when it is stated so openly. However, the same contempt underlies all consequentialist arguments against inherent rights.

Motivated Reasoning

Underlying all consequentialist arguments about which rights to recognise is the positivist assumption that rights are essentially arbitrary. This is the belief that we may choose to recognise whichever rights we all agree to recognise. Consequentialists think they can choose which rights to recognise on the basis of which outcome they want (and think they will achieve). This is to misconceive the very purpose of ethics, which is to provide a means for the peaceful resolution of all potential conflict. In order to resolve conflicts without aggression one must appeal to objective rules grounded in incontrovertible arguments. Valid rights are not merely chosen arbitrarily, they are discovered through reasoned argument.

The whole line of argument- that children do not have inherent rights because that would prevent us from doing things we deem important- makes this positivist assumption that rights should be allocated arbitrarily on the basis of desired outcome. The approach starts with a desired outcome in mind and then arbitrarily retrofits the ethical rules that will create that outcome. When the desired outcome is infanticide for population control, the arguer works backwards to the conclusion that children do not have rights. Similarly, when the desired outcome is exterminating unwanted children with abortion, the arguer works backwards to the conclusion that unborn children do not have rights.

This is blatant motivated reasoning. The utility of a claim does not make it valid. Whether you desire a particular outcome has no bearing on whether you are justified to deny an individual's rights in order to create that outcome. Whether rights are valid or not depends on whether they are argumentatively indisputable without contradiction, not whether they lead to what you want.

Opponents of Parental Responsibility Cannot Help Conceding The Argument

Any author who writes about the philosophy of the family long enough ends up conceding the principle that parents have causal responsibility for their children. This principle is so undeniable that even those who oppose it cannot help eventually making the argument for it in spite of themselves. Here are some examples.

Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson's highly influential Defense of Abortion was based on the argument that parents have no causal positive obligations, they may only have voluntarily accepted obligations:

Surely we do not have any such "special responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it. But if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it.

This argument by Thomson was highly influential on Rothbard, Brake, and many other opponents of causal parental obligation. Yet in the very same article, Thomson concedes the principle that parents have causal responsibility for the children that they create (at least in some cases):

Suppose a woman voluntarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in pregnancy, and she does become pregnant; is she not in part responsible for the presence of the unborn person inside her? No doubt she did not invite it in. But doesn’t her partial responsibility for its being there itself give it a right to the use of her body? … there are some cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother’s body, and therefore some cases in which abortion is unjust killing. There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, if any. At any rate the argument certainly does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing.

Having conceded the principle of causal parental obligation, Thomson's fallback objection is that it does not apply in all cases. Not only does she completely avoid the most essential question (what determines the exceptions?) but she tries to reverse the burden of proof by arguing that since abortion may not be unjust killing in all cases, therefore abortion is justified. On the contrary, since she has conceded that any given abortion may be unjust killing, it must therefore be considered prima facie illegitimate unless proven otherwise. Mary Meehan's hunter analogy illustrates the fallacy of Thomson's line of argument:

Hunters notice movement in a thicket, but don’t know whether it is caused by a deer or another human being. If they shoot without determining the facts, and kill a human, they are guilty of homicide. Many abortion supporters say they cannot find out, yet they are willing to shoot anyway.

Murray Rothbard

Murray Rothbard argued that parents have no enforceable obligations to their children, on the grounds that the combination of creating someone and them being helpless does not generate obligation. Yet he clearly set out the case for parental obligation based on responsibility for creating a child who is (as a result of being created) placed in a state of helplessness:

The moral duty or responsibility of the parents to their children stems also from their act of voluntary creation, from their responsibility for bringing helpless babies into the world. Their moral responsibility is to raise these children, to bring them from their natural state of infant dependency to the status of rational, self-owning, independent adults. Their moral responsibility is to rear the children to the status of independence. What, then, does this imply? It implies caring, provision of food, shelter, education, etc., to the best of the parents' love and ability.

When Rothbard used the words "moral" duty, he meant by this that the obligation is not enforcible. By this he means that it is a matter of personal virtue only. Why should this be only a moral duty and not an enforcible one? Rothbard does not explain. If you remove the word moral, Rothbard has set out the case for enforcible parental obligations.

Elizabeth Brake

Elizabeth Brake is one of the main advocates for the theory that parental obligations arise only as a result of voluntary acceptance, and not as a result of actions taken by the parents. Yet in setting out her case, Brake concedes the causal argument. She accepts that procreation creates obligations (she calls these "procreative costs"). She argues that since what she calls "procreative costs" may not be identical to the parental obligations that are socially accepted by modern American culture, this proves that parental obligations are not created by the causal actions of the parent. It proves nothing of the sort.

Brake thinks the decisive argument is whether or not causal responsibility would give rise to the same conventional obligations as those in any particular culture. On the contrary, the point is that the causal responsibility of parents gives rise to an objective standard for obligations. It doesn't matter what the particular fashions are for parental behaviour towards children. Cultural conventions can include all sorts of acts by parents that are philosophically unjustifiable, for example circumcising infants. What matters is the objective requirement of the child to be removed from peril by being raised to self-sufficiency in adulthood. Parental obligations are as extensive as necessary to meet that objective requirement, including a child's psychological needs such as love, affection, attention, safe boundaries, encouragement etc. Yet they would also exclude all local conventions that cannot be objectively justified.

Since Brake's objection that causal parental obligations might not map exactly onto local conventions is irrelevant, what is left is her admission that the principle of causal obligations itself is valid. Brake accepts parental "obligations entailed by moral responsibility for a child's existence". She concedes that "parental obligations arise… for having placed the child in a needy situation in which its right to a minimally decent life is threatened". The fact that she chooses her own terminology of "procreative costs" is immaterial. She has accepted the basic principle that parents do have responsibility for the consequences of their actions, regardless of their intentions.

Having accepted this causal principle, Brake's own logic should compel her to reject the validity of abortion, since abortion is incompatible with such obligations. Yet she accepts both parental obligations and abortion. Such a clear contradiction can only be maintained if one is to take the position that parents have not yet caused a child to exist until they decide not to abort the child. This is to pursue motivated reasoning into the realm of absurdity.

Roderick Long

Roderick Long is another opponent of the causal responsibility of parents. Like Brake, Long argues that parental obligations can only be voluntary. Yet he also sets out the causal argument. In creating a child, the parents have put him in mortal danger and this is why parenting is a positive obligation resulting from causal action. Long concedes the principle that if someone puts another in danger and fails to act, that would be a homicide, so he concedes the existence of an obligation created in this way:

If S voluntarily places O in a situation where S’s failure to take positive action on O’s behalf will result in O’s death, then such a failure on S’s part is a killing, not merely a letting-die.”

He acknowledges that one may acquire positive obligations as a result of the consequences of one's actions, even if those consequences were unintended:

negative rights generate derivative positive rights. If you (intentionally or accidentally) take my umbrella, you acquire an enforceable obligation to take positive steps to return it to me

He also sets out the case for how enforceable positive obligations can arise by the creation of peril:

suppose Frieda is careening around the corner in her Lamborghini and suddenly sees Roscoe ambling across the road a short distance ahead. At her current speed, she has only two choices: (a) she can run over Roscoe, or (b) she can swerve around him. Running over Roscoe would be a violation of his negative rights; so Frieda has an enforceable obligation not to run over him. In the circumstances, what that amounts to is an enforceable obligation to swerve around him. But that obligation is not an obligation to sit back and do nothing; it is an obligation to take positive action, and a very specific positive action at that: she must turn the steering wheel in order to avoid running over Roscoe. Here we have a case, then, in which Frieda has an enforceable obligation to take positive action on Roscoe’s behalf – but only because that is the only way she can avoid violating her negative obligation not to treat Roscoe as a mere means. Roscoe’s right against Frieda not to be run over has generated, in the circumstances, a further right against her that she turn the wheel in a certain way.

This logic applies directly to parents. If a man and a woman engage in consensual sex and create a child, whether they intended to or not they have changed the state of the universe from one in which no child was in mortal peril to one in which a child is in mortal peril. They are thereby just as obliged to remove the child from peril as Long's Lamborghini driver is obliged to avoid hitting the pedestrian.

These authors all oppose the principle of causal parental obligations even though they also inadvertently set out the argument for it. They oppose it because they are engaged in motivated reasoning. All four authors understand that accepting the principle of parental obligations is incompatible with abortion. They consider a defence of abortion to be a core principle, so they refuse to accept the principle of causal parental obligations. Even when they make the argument for it despite themselves.

A Critique of Rothbard's Theory Of Parental Ownership

Self ownership is a central principle of libertarian philosophy. Individuals own themselves and this ownership right is inalienable. Therefore, individuals cannot be owned as property. If this is a principle, it applies in all cases. However, many libertarians are unclear on whether the principle applies to children, especially infants. Do babies own themselves?

A minority of libertarian writers have advocated the theory that parents own their children as property. Benjamin Tucker stated the idea bluntly:

the unemancipated child is the property of its mother, of which, by an obvious corollary, she may dispose as freely as she may dispose of any other property belonging to her.

This position is clear: babies are property in the same way that slaves are. This is a bizarre argument for a "libertarian" to make and most other libertarians rightly criticise it. One critic of this position was Murray Rothbard, who wrote:

It is grotesque to think that the parents can actually own the child’s body as well as physical property; it is advocating slavery and denying the fundamental right of self-ownership to permit such ownership of others, regardless of age.

Yet Rothbard himself advocated a version of parental ownership, contradicting his own argument that children cannot be owned. This article provides a critique of Rothbard's theory of parental ownership.

Rothbard's Conflicting Arguments on Parental Ownership

The reason Rothbard gives for parental ownership is that children cannot be self owners:

First, we may say that the parents—or rather the mother, who is the only certain and visible parent—as the creators of the baby become its owners. A newborn baby cannot be an existent self-owner in any sense. Therefore, either the mother or some other party or parties may be the baby’s owner

Why can't a baby be a self owner? Rothbard does not elaborate but his reasoning seems to be that their inability to exercise control means that they cannot be rightful owners. In Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature, he argues that rights come from the power to use them and babies don't have this power:

It is evident that the baby has no de facto power of self-ownership; and since adult rights in natural law derive from adult powers and faculties, who does own the baby? … During the early years of babyhood, when the child is helpless and has few if any powers of self-ownership, he indeed becomes a kind of property of his creators, his parents.

The fact that babies are unable to control their bodies in anything more than a rudimentary way does not invalidate their legitimate ownership of their bodies. One must recognise the distinction between legitimate ownership and de facto control to have a theory of property rights. Without this distinction one is left with the belief that might is right. If someone steals my car, I am not capable of controlling the vehicle at all. Nonetheless I am still the rightful owner. Therefore Rothbard's argument that rightful ownership comes from de facto control must be incorrect.

To complicate matters, Rothbard also argues that babies have a right to self ownership:

In short, every baby, as soon as it is born and is therefore no longer contained within his mother's body, possesses the right of self-ownership by virtue of being a separate entity and a potential adult. It must therefore be illegal and a violation of the child's rights for a parent to aggress against his person by mutilating, torturing, murdering him, etc.

So we have four conflicting propositions from Rothbard:

1. It is "grotesque" to think that the parents can own children
2. A newborn baby cannot be an existent self-owner in any sense
3. The mother is the rightful owner of the baby
4. Babies possess the right of self-ownership

Why did Rothbard seem to contradict himself by arguing that babies cannot be self owners and also arguing that babies have a right to self ownership? I believe that what he was getting at in an unclear way is that babies are unable to exercise effective self ownership and therefore somebody else has to be their owner for their own good.

However, as already discussed, being unable to exercise control over your property right does not invalidate your right to it. Babies are self owners, even when they are helpless and incapable ones.

Individuals Cannot Be Homesteaded

Rothbard assumes that a baby is something that can be homesteaded. He refers to the mother as "its natural or “homesteading” owner". Why does the mother get to homestead the baby but the baby not get to homestead itself? If homesteading were the way that ownership of babies is allocated then the baby's lack of ability to control itself would explain why Rothbard thinks the mother does the homesteading. Here is Rothbard's line of reasoning:

1. Property rights are allocated by the process of homesteading, whereby an individual takes ownership of a previously unowned resources through demonstrative physical acts. Examples of these demonstrative acts include physically taking hold of a resource or creating a border around it.
2. Infants are incapable of homesteading something since they cannot demonstrate taking ownership through physical acts.
3. Therefore infants cannot be property owners.
4. Therefore infants cannot be self owners.

The implicit assumption in this argument is that homesteading is the method of establishing self ownership. But homesteading is not the only way to allocate property rights. Property rights are rightfully assigned to the person with the best objective link. For unowned physical objects, the best objective link is demonstrated by first-use homesteading. However, homesteading cannot be used to establish self ownership since the acts required for homesteading presuppose recognition of self ownership.

Each individual has the best objective link for ownership of their own body. This is the objective rule used for establishing self ownership. Babies own themselves because nobody else has a better objective claim to own them. The best objective link is not dependent on the capabilities of the baby. It doesn't matter if babies cannot yet argue a syllogism or advocate for their rights, they still have the objectively better claim to be the owners of their own body simply because they are the inhabitants of that body.

Furthermore, the idea of a mother owning a baby and then the baby acquiring ownership is logically flawed. You cannot acquire ownership of yourself because you cannot homestead anything unless you already have self ownership. So how is a baby supposed to acquire self ownership? Self ownership must be presumed from the get-go as the only non-contradictory basis for libertarian ethics. All other libertarian principles, such as homesteading, depend on the assumption of self-ownership. There is no way to come up with a non-contradictory account of an individual starting as property and becoming a self owner.

Rothbard's Two Models Of Limited Parental Ownership

Rothbard goes on to argue that although parents own their children, they only have a limited kind of ownership:

But surely the mother or parents may not receive the ownership of the child in absolute fee simple, because that would imply the bizarre state of affairs that a fifty-year old adult would be subject to the absolute and unquestioned jurisdiction of his seventy-year-old parent. So the parental property right must be limited in time. But it also must be limited in kind, for it surely would be grotesque for a libertarian who believes in the right of self-ownership to advocate the right of a parent to murder or torture his or her children. We must therefore state that, even from birth, the parental ownership is not absolute but of a "trustee" or guardianship kind.

This leaves a lot of open questions. Firstly, Rothbard mentions two possible analogies of the parental ownership role: trustee or guardian. He does not specify which, and there is a difference in the implications for self ownership.

A trustee holds legal title to the trust property, albeit not beneficial title. This means that a trustee does "own" the trust property legally, but this ownership is not absolute. This sounds exactly like the kind of limited ownership model that Rothbard is advocating. If the parent is a trustee, the implication for the question of ownership is indeed that the child is not a self owner. This model would explain why Rothbard thought that he needed to argue that parents own their children.

In contrast, guardians do not own the assets of their wards; they merely manage them on behalf of the ward. The ward retains ownership of his property, but the guardian has the authority to manage the property on his behalf and is obligated to act in the best interests of the ward. If the parent is a guardian, the implication for the question of ownership is that the child is a self owner. The child remains a self owner even while he is temporarily under the tutelage of the parent. This is an accurate characterisation of the parent child relationship, but if Rothbard was thinking of this model then he would not need to argue that parents own their children.

What Was Rothbard Trying To Achieve?

Rothbard had three conflicting goals in his theory of parental ownership:

1. He wanted to protect the family from outside interference.
2. He wanted a mechanism for parents to have authority over their children.
3. At the same time, he wanted to deny enforceable parental obligations.

Despite denying parental obligations, Rothbard still wanted his theory to legitimate the relationship between natural parents and children. In developing his theory, he was addressing the problem of how to prevent others from taking children away from their parents. Since he also chose to argue that parents have no obligations to their children, he needed an alternative mechanism to bind the child to the parents. He uses parental property rights as the basis:

to assert that a third party can claim his “ownership” over the baby would give that person the right to seize the baby by force from its natural or “homesteading” owner, its mother. The mother, then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby, and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an invasion of her property right.

Notice how, on Rothbard's account, the only victim in cases of child abduction is the parent (and not the child), since the crime is theft of parental property. On the contrary, when one recognises parental obligations, in child abduction cases the primary victim is the child, who is being kidnapped and deprived of his legitimate claim against his parents for care.

Rothbard also wanted to defend the concept of parental authority. The child liberation movement in the 1970s advocated the view that parents do not have any legitimate authority over their children. This is arguably the logical consequence of Rothbard's own theory of parenting as charity, but Rothbard himself saw the need for parental authority:

We see here the fundamental flaw in the progressive notion that parents should allow their young children unlimited freedom to do as they wish and not to "impose" training, values, or education on them. For the young child, still not in possession of knowledge, values, self-discipline, or much rationality, is hardly in a position to be able to decide what he should be doing or wishing. Failure to function as rational "authorities" or failure to provide that training and those values to the best of their ability, is a tragic abdication of the basic parental responsibility--which is not simply to provide food and shelter but also mental and moral training.

What justifies parental authority? Rothbard invoked parental ownership of the home as the primary basis of parental authority. Parents have the right to make rules for their children in the way that any property owner can make rules for those who occupy their property (in line with basic libertarian principles). But parental ownership of the child is another mechanism Rothbard appealed to in order to justify parental authority. For Rothbard, parental authority is derived from parental ownership of the child. It is a benefit of ownership. On the contrary, if one recognises parental obligations, then parental authority is a consequence of parental obligations. Parents may only use their authority to fulfil their obligations and the obligations provide both the justification and limit of that authority.

Parental Ownership Rights Are Merely Asserted

The hole in Rothbard's theory of limited parental ownership is that it lacks any justification. The right of parents to "homestead" a limited ownership of children is merely asserted. On what grounds did Rothbard believe that children come into the world as homesteadable property in waiting? This assertion contradicts the basic libertarian principle that individuals are self owners.

His reasoning seems to be this:

1. Children are incapable.
2. Therefore somebody has to take care of them.
3. There could be conflicts over who takes care of a child.
4. Therefore the role of parent is a scarce resource and is subject to the rules of homesteading.

But why should the helplessness of a child make them ownable property? Does the helplessness of an inveterate drug addict make him subject to ownership by someone else for his own good? If not, how does Rothbard differentiate between these cases? Rothbard is engaged in a circular argument that parents own children because children need to be owned by parents. To base a theory of parental ownership on the assumption that parents can own children is begging the question.

The Core Premise At Fault

Rothbard ended up arguing himself into this corner because of a faulty premise: he was determined to argue that parents have no obligations towards their children. If you start with this premise, it creates all these unresolved questions: who has responsibility for infants? Why shouldn't someone else be allowed to become the parent if the they want to? The theory of parental responsibility provides a clear answer to all these questions, and it all starts with parental obligation based on the action of parents putting children in a state of peril by creating them. Since Rothbard rejected parental obligation, he tried to resolve these questions with a convoluted theory of children as homesteadable property. It was incorrect.

The Correct Formulation Of The Parental Role

All of these problems are resolved if you drop the faulty premise that parents do not have obligations to their children. Here is the argument:

1. By creating children, parents are responsible for their state of peril.
2. Parents therefore have an obligation as a strict liability tort to remove their children from peril. This is achieved by doing whatever is necessary to raise them to become self-sufficient adults.
3. In order to fulfil this obligation parents must take on the role of guardian. Children can only be saved from peril if parents fulfil this role. The guardianship role is not a homesteadable property right, it is an obligation resulting from creation of peril.
4. Being a guardian involves fiduciary duty and the authority to act on the children's best interests. This includes the authority to coerce the child in limited and specific circumstances: each act of coercion is only justifiable if it is clearly in fulfilment of the best interests of the child.
5. None of the this changes the status of children as self owners.

Children are self owners, even when they are babies. You are the rightful owner of yourself from the moment you are created.

The Secular Justification for Inherent Rights

One objection to the theory of inherent rights is that this concept is based on religious dogma. This argument runs as follows:

1. The theory of inherent rights is based on the concept of the sanctity of life.
2. The sanctity of life is a concept derived from religious dogma.
3. Religious dogma is rationally indefensible.
4. Any philosophically sound system of ethics must be rationally defensible.
5. Therefore inherent rights are invalid.

Peter Singer is one of the most influential proponents of this argument. He makes the argument as part of his contention that infanticide is morally acceptable and that human newborns should have less rights than some animals. He argues that one should overcome the concept of all humans having a right to life because it is not based on rational argument:

The change in Western attitudes to infanticide since Roman times is, like the doctrine of the sanctity of human life of which it is a part, a product of Christianity. Perhaps it is now possible to think about these issues without assuming the Christian moral framework that has, for so long, prevented any fundamental reassessment.

- Practical Ethics by Peter Singer

Stephan Kinsella asserts that the only possible justification for inherent rights is a religious one:

Only religious theories that assume a soul inhering in the individual from conception can really justify attributing rights to humans from day 0, i.e. from conception. For they believe the soul is both necessary and sufficient for rights; and since we have it from day 0, we have rights from day 0.

This objection to inherent rights is invalid for the following reasons:

1. The philosophical argument from inherent rights is entirely independent of Christian or any other religious belief.
2. Therefore, the fact that Christianity (or any religion) holds human life to be sacred is immaterial to the philosophical question of whether rights are inherent.
3. Just because Christians conclude that it is immoral to kill unborn children based on religious dogma, this does not invalidate the secular argument that unborn children have rights.

There is an entirely secular justification for inherent rights. The argument is as follows:

1. Property rights are required to prevent conflict over scarce resources.
2. Only certain property rights are valid. The criterion for determining if a right is valid is whether it conforms to the meta-ethical rules derived from the logic of argumentation and the requirements of non-contradiction.
3. These meta-ethical rules include (a) the requirement that no rule is conflict-promoting and (b) the requirement that there must be an objective and inter-subjectively ascertainable link between specific individuals and all scarce goods at every moment in time. An unborn child's body is an example of a scarce good.
4. The theory of acquired rights violates numerous meta-ethical rules, including (a) and (b) listed above.
5. The theory of inherent rights does not violate any meta-ethical rules.
6. Therefore, the correct rights theory is the theory of inherent rights.

The Argument From Incredulity Against Inherent Rights

Libertarians argue that individuals have rights but disagree over whether rights are inherent or acquired. As I have argued elsewhere, the theory of acquired rights is not logically defensible. Only the theory of inherent rights provides libertarianism with a coherent rights theory. However, this is not the majority view among libertarians, many of whom apparently cannot believe the implications of the theory of inherent rights.

The claim that a human embryo or fetus has rights seems to be astoundingly counter-intuitive to many libertarians. Some libertarians find this idea so unimaginable that they forget to actually make an argument and merely state their own incredulity as their refutation. The result is that one of the most common objections to the theory of inherent rights made by libertarians is the argument from incredulity. This article provides some examples.

Benjamin Tucker thought that children do not have rights because they are the property of their parents. He seemed to think it persuasive that if this were not the case then a pregnant woman could not commit suicide at will:

Certainly the mother’s title to the child while it remains in her womb will not be denied by any Anarchist. To deny this would be to deny the right of the mother to commit suicide during pregnancy, and I never knew an Anarchist to deny the right of suicide.

Walter Block made almost exactly the same argument. He considers the very idea that a pregnant woman may not ethically commit suicide so preposterous as to make his case with it:

Consider the case where the mother dies while pregnant, through suicide. Wisniewski would have to consider her a murderer as well, since she had invited in the fetus, and now leaves it in the lurch, unjustifiably killing it, too. In contrast, I am not logically forced into that conclusion.

Elsewhere, Block reiterates his disbelief that anyone could hold such an argument:

no one else would make this sort of legal judgment. More important, it is simply incorrect to regard the pregnant woman who commits suicide as a murderer

Neither Tucker nor Block could conceive that there are circumstances under which it is immoral for a parent to immediately kill themselves. One wonders if they would also be incredulous of anyone who thinks that it is immoral for someone driving a vehicle at high speed on a busy street to shoot himself at the wheel, or for the pilot of a passenger aircraft to commit suicide mid flight. Would they argue that the rights of the driver and the pilot to immediate suicide override the rights of innocent bystanders not to be killed by their actions?

Wendy McElroy demonstrated her incredulity when she pointed to the implications of inherent rights for pregnant mothers who want to take drugs or go parachute jumping:

if you admit the idea that the fetus is a human being for whom the woman is legally responsible, then the woman cannot take any action to imperil the life and well-being of the fetus. Almost everything she puts into her system is automatically introduced into the system of the fetus and, if the substance is harmful, it constitutes assault upon the fetus on the same level as strapping me down and forcing drugs into my body. Moreover, life-endangering acts, such as parachute jumping, would place the unconsenting fetus in unreasonable danger. If the woman has no right to kill the fetus, she can have no right to jeopardize its life and well-being.

Amazing though it seems to McElroy, yes, the principle of parental obligations combined with the inherent rights of children implies that it is not ethical to take heroin or go BASE jumping as a pregnant woman. McElroy provided another argument from incredulity at the idea that certain types of birth control may not be morally legitimate:

Since an individual with full human rights is said to exist at the moment of fertilization and since IUDs work by disrupting fertilized eggs, women who use these devices must be guilty of attempted murder, if not murder itself. Other forms of birth control which work not by preventing fertilization but by destroying the zygote would be murder weapons and doctors who supplied them would be accessories. As absurd as this sounds, it is the logical implication of considering a zygote to be a human being.

What exactly does McElroy find absurd? Some forms of birth control work by killing unborn children and other forms work by preventing pregnancy. If unborn children have rights, then those forms of birth control that work by killing unborn children are not morally defensible. Although she does not accept this argument, I don't think McElroy could say that the argument is logically absurd. Perhaps what she finds absurd is the enormity of the implications if she were to accept the theory as valid. This is to deny an argument on the basis that it cannot possibly be true because if it were, then the implications would be shocking. That itself is another form of the argument from incredulity.

Stephan Kinsella provided a very succinct argument from incredulity regarding inherent rights:

it seems obvious to me that a one-day old zygote has no rights yet, even though it is a potential human person, and biologically a “human life.” It also seems obvious to me that infants have rights, so that infanticide is murder.

He made a similar argument back in the 1990s, where he simply assumes the conclusion:

In the case of abortion we know the endpoints: zygotes have no rights; adult humans do. Somewhere in between we develop rights.

Conclusion

Since the argument from incredulity is a logical fallacy, it is self-refuting. It is remarkably fatuous of libertarians to resort to this argument. Edward Feser's comments on the shallowness of the argument are well made:

Appealing, as is often done, to what a fetus, embryo, or zygote “looks like” is unhelpful, and even philosophically frivolous: one might claim that a table “doesn’t look like” a collection of atoms swirling about, but that’s what a table is. And in fact, a table does look like that: that is exactly what a collection of atoms swirling about looks like when it is in the form of a table. Similarly, to the charge that a fetus, at whatever stage of development, “doesn’t look like” a person or a human being, one ought to reply, “Of course it does; that’s exactly what a human being or a person looks like at one month (or one week, or whatever) of development.”

Why Do Fathers Have Parental Obligations?

One of the important logical consequences of the causal principle of parental obligations is that both the mother and father are jointly and severally liable for parental obligations to the child. Parents have obligations because they placed their children in a state of peril by causing them to exist. This creates a strict liability tort. The children have a legitimate claim on the parents to remove them from peril, which is done by raising the child to self-sufficiency in adulthood.

The action that creates parental obligation is making one's gametes available for fusion. If a man or woman engages in consensual sex or voluntarily makes gametes available for any artificial procreative procedure, then he or she has responsibility for any resultant child. This is because one has responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of one's actions, regardless of whether those consequences were desired or not.

It is hugely significant that the causal principle is the only theory of parental obligation which applies equally to mothers and fathers. All competing theories fail to obligate fathers. Since most libertarians who have written on the subject of parental obligations do not accept the causal principle of parental obligations, it is not surprising that fathers have been invisible in libertarian writing.

Rothbard's libertarian theory of parenting- I call it a theory of parenting as charity- argues that parents do not have obligations. For obvious reasons, this theory can never hold a man responsible for any children he begets. Whether he takes any responsibility for his children is his arbitrary choice. This theory of ethics also holds that the mother has no obligations, but since biological reality is that the woman gets pregnant, the effective result of implementing this ethical system in practice would be that a woman always faces the risk that she will be left to raise the child alone, since men have zero obligation.

It is easy to argue neither parent has obligations, but the fact is that a father can walk away from his unborn child whereas a pregnant mother cannot. The net effect of Rothbard's theory is to legitimise the despicable behaviour of those men who create children and then refuse to take responsibility for them, leaving the mother with all responsibility. Rothbard's theory that parents do not have positive obligations has blatantly sexist practical implications, albeit unintentionally.

The advocates of this theory do not want the theory to have such radically different implications for men and women. This is why all advocates of this theory are staunchly pro-choice (as Rothbard was). The appeal of abortion for this theory is that it addresses the practical barrier women face in declining parental obligations compared to men. Abortion supposedly offers women the chance to remove themselves from obligation, like the men can.

But this is all false. Firstly, you cannot legitimately give up parental obligations and the men are at fault for trying to do so. Secondly, killing the baby is not a legitimate choice (this is itself another logical implication of the causal principle of parental obligations). Effectively Rothbard's theory legitimises men walking away from their responsibilities as fathers, and for women it legitimises the fallback option of committing murder. This theory has many other awful logical consequences, such as the idea that child abandonment, starvation, and any kind of negligence are legitimate.

Some libertarians such as Roderick Long and Steve Horwitz advocate an alternative theory of parental obligations, but this alternative theory also has no way to obligate fathers. They argue that parents voluntarily accept parental obligations by agreeing to a tacit contract with society at large. The obvious implication of this theory is that only the parent who agrees to the contract is obliged. This logically means that the father is never obliged unless he chooses to be. Most advocates of this theory refuse to accept this clear logical consequence.

A variant of this theory argued by Roderick Long is that a father may be obligated to his child as a result of having played a role in creating the child, but the father's obligation is entirely dependent on the choices of the mother. What started out looking like an acceptance of the principle that one is responsible for the consequences of one's actions ultimately collapses into advocating that the arbitrary decree of the mother is the determinant of a father's parental obligations. The motivation behind this reasoning is to leave women the chance to remove parental obligations by abortion but prevent men from declining obligations if the woman does choose to have the baby. Whereas Rothbard's theory had sexist implications against women, Roderick Long chooses sexism against men. According to the logic of Long's double-standard theory, there is no reason why a woman could not go one further and both deny parental obligations for herself while simultaneously stipulating obligations for the father.

The idea that fathers can legitimately create children without having any responsibility towards them is absurd. Very few people actually believe this. Libertarian theory should accurately reflect that both parents have obligations to their children.

What The Declaration of Independence Should Have Said

The US Declaration of Independence is one of the most influential documents in the history of libertarianism. The preamble has had a lasting impact on the philosophy of rights:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

However, the original text does not accurately reflect later developments in the libertarian conception of rights. If it did, it might read something like this:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are equally subject to universal law, that they have certain unalienable Rights, that among these are property rights to one's body and to anything acquired by homesteading or voluntary agreement, that opposing these rights is rationally indefensible.

Some notes on the original declaration:

• It is not self-evident that all men are created equal since they are obviously not equal physically, in aptitude, in family circumstances, nor in numerous other ways. What is self-evident is the principle that regardless of the circumstances of their birth, they are equally subject to universal law.
• Self ownership includes the right to one's life, since to damage a body is an assault on that person's property. Similarly, liberty is a derivative concept of self ownership.
• The reference to happiness was a compromise (originally it was supposed to be property which is much clearer). Since every individual can be said to pursue happiness by definition, referring to the pursuit of happiness is either superfluous or irrelevant.
• In referencing property instead of happiness, it is clearer to identify the legitimate sources of property rights: self ownership as the best objective link to the body, homesteading as the objective rule for new property, and voluntary agreement for everything else.
• The reason something is self-evident is because it cannot be denied without contradiction. That was not quite true of the original preamble but is true for the suggested revision above.

Abortion is Incompatible With Parental Obligations

The causal principle of parental obligations has radical implications. As outlined in an earlier post, this principle had first been expressed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but early proponents did not identify any of the far-reaching implications of the idea. In the twentieth century, these implications started to be expressed.

The first radical implication of the causal principle to be identified is that it refutes any justification of abortion in cases of consensual sex. This implication was implicit in the arguments of philosopher Richard Werner's 1974 article Abortion: The Moral Status of the Unborn. Werner did not reference any of the previous authors who discussed the causal principle of parental obligations and it is not clear if he was influenced by them or had deduced the principle independently. However, even if not discussed explicitly, many of his arguments were directly based on this principle.

Werner's article contains a critique of Judith Jarvis Thomson's influential 1971 article A Defence of Abortion. Werner refuted Thomson's analogy between a fetus and a burglar. He pointed out that the salient principle in both cases is that the individual who acts has moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions. In the case of burglary it is the burglar who acts and is responsible, but in the case of pregnancy it is the parents who act (and not the fetus):

In Thomson's case, the burglar is acting immorally by entering the window whether it be opened or closed, locked or unlocked, barred or unbarred. It is this fact which makes us decide that the burglar, rather than the window opener who has every right to open his window, is responsible for his own wrongdoing. On the other hand, the embryo cannot be held responsible for its conception nor is it under any moral obligation not to be conceived. Whether or not it is conceived is entirely dependent on the actions of its parents. It is this fact which should make us conclude that the parents are responsible for the conception and existence of the embryo.

Werner argued that a standard of strict liability tort applies to parental obligations by analogising with firing a gun:

Even if the two take the best possible precautions against pregnancy, they still know or are accountable for knowing that these precautions are not 100% effective and that the foreseeable and natural consequences of their actions may still be an unwanted pregnancy. So, by engaging in intercourse, they are responsible for and obligated to accept the consequences of their actions. This situation is analogous to that of a man who derives great satisfaction from taking target practice with his gun. Unfortunately, he lives in a very crowded community: so he builds the most elaborately protective shooting range possible in the basement of his home. He is. nevertheless, aware that it is only 99% effective in stopping bullets and that use of the range could eventually result in the death of some innocent human. But, because of the great satisfaction he derives, he begins firing his gun in the basement anyway. Now if this man eventually kills someone, surely he is still morally responsible for their death. In firing the gun he knew that one of the foreseeable and natural consequences of his actions may be the killing of an innocent human. Like the two engaging in intercourse, this man has created a special obligation through his actions: they by engaging in intercourse, he by firing his gun in a crowded community.

Doris Gordon was the first advocate of the causal principle of parental obligations both to explicitly identify the principle and to show how it refutes the justification for abortion. Gordon had been greatly influenced by Ayn Rand and the Objectivist movement. Following Rand's staunch defence of abortion, Gordon assumed that being pro-choice was a logical outcome of Objectivist ideas. But she began to question how this could be reconciled with parental obligations.

One of the most influential Objectivists, Nathaniel Branden, had put forward a short statement on parental obligations in the Objectivist Newsletter of 1962. Although he did not express the key role that creation of peril plays in the causal principle, Branden did argue that parents have positive obligations as a result of their actions:

The key to understanding the nature of parental obligation lies in the moral principle that human beings must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions. A child is the responsibility of his parents, because (a) they brought him into existence, and (b) a child, by nature, cannot survive independently. (The fact that the parents might not have desired the child, in a given case, is irrelevant in this context; he is nevertheless the consequence of their chosen actions– a consequence that, as a possibility, was foreseeable.) The essence of parental responsibility is: to equip the child for independent survival as an adult. This means, to provide for the child's physical and mental development and well-being: to feed, clothe and protect him; to raise him in a stable, intelligible, rational home environment, to equip him intellectually, training him to live as a rational being; to educate him to earn his livelihood (teaching him to hunt, for instance, in a primitive society; sending him to college, perhaps, in an advanced civilization).

On reading Branden's article, Doris Gordon realised that the principle of parental obligations stated by Branden cannot be reconciled with a defence of abortion. The two positions are contradictory. Yet Branden was pro-choice, as all Objectivists were. When Gordon confronted Branden with this problem he refused to discuss it or to accept the contradiction.

Gordon became an anti-abortion advocate. She saw abortion as incompatible with libertarianism in numerous ways, but the central argument she used against abortion was that it violated the principle of parental obligations. She stated this argument in her 1979 article How I Became Pro-Life: Remarks on Abortion, Parental Obligation, and the Draft:

There is no conflict of rights between mother (or father) and child because parents have an obligation to care for their children and, therefore, children have a right to that care. … If children are children before as well as after birth, then parents have the obligation to care for them, also. This means women have no right to choose to kill their unborn or to evict them from their bodies. Mothers have the obligation, instead, to house and feed them and protect them in the womb. … Conceiving children may be unintentional on our part, but having sex is usually a voluntary act and most people know getting pregnant is a possible side effect. We have some choice in the matter of creating children. It is the children who have no choice about being affected when we experience the pleasures of sex. Not only are children not responsible for the consequences of a mother's pregnancy upon herself, neither are they to blame for their need to remain in the womb. This need is something we impose upon them when we create them. The child's life and needs are a package deal. Once having brought children into a state of dependency, we have the obligation to bring them safely out. This means we must wait until they are able to come "out" safely. This also means parental obligation continues after childbirth.

Gordon started the advocacy group Libertarians for Life, arguing against abortion on secular, libertarian grounds. Other contrubutors to Libertarians for Life made similar arguments against abortion based on the principle of parental obligations. For example, in his 1991 article Why Parental Obligation?, John Walker emphasised the that it is creation of peril, not harm, that obliges parents:

When we have sex, we know there is a possibility to bring someone into existence who will be in very grave danger, who will be in harm's way. …The responsibility of parents is, then, not to recompense for any wrong done, but to make sure it doesn't happen. Because they put their kids in that position. The kids are totally dependent upon them, totally subject to their control. They put them in harms way. Well, in some sense, there is no injustice committed by being put in harm's way. The injustice happens when they let the harm befall the kid.

It was not until the early 1990s that some of the other radical implications of the causal principle of parental obligations were identified in an obscure journal article. That will be the subject of a future post.

Where Does The Causal Theory Of Parental Obligations Come From?

The causal theory of parental obligations had odd beginnings. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the basic principles of this theory were stated by three different thinkers, yet none of these early proponents explored the wider implications of the idea. It was not until the twentieth century that a few people started to realise the enormous significance of this theory. In this post, I will outline how the theory emerged.

The earliest presentation of the causal argument for parental obligations is by the legal theorist William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in 1765. Blackstone argued that creating a child entails the obligation to care for it:

The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Pufendorf, laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the children life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have a perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents.

In this brief passage, Blackstone captures some essential features of the causal argument:

1. It is the actions of the parents (in creating the child) that give rise to the child being in peril.
2. If the parents were to fail to care for their children, the result would be that the child will perish.
3. Therefore the parents have an obligation to prevent this happening.

Blackstone credits Samuel Pufendorf as the source of this causal argument, but it is not clear that his interpretation of Pufendorf was correct. In his On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673), Pufendorf had made a slightly different argument that parental authority rests on natural law and the "tacit consent" of the offspring. It seems to have been Blackstone who first stated the causal argument clearly, although Blackstone himself only offers this brief statement of the argument and does not elucidate its further implications.

The first major philosopher to put forward the causal argument for parental obligations was Kant. There is no evidence that Kant got this argument from Blackstone. He may have read Blackstone or deduced the argument independently. In Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (1797) Kant argued parental obligation comes from bringing an infant into the world without consent and placing it in peril:

From the fact of procreation…, there follows the duty of preserving and rearing children as the products of this union. Accordingly, children, as persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital right — distinguished from mere hereditary right — to be reared by the care of their parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves; and this provision becomes immediately theirs by law, without any particular juridical act being required to determine it. For what is thus produced is a person, and it is impossible to think of a being endowed with personal freedom as produced merely by a physical process. And hence, in the practical relation, it is quite a correct and even a necessary idea to regard the act of generation as a process by which a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the responsible free will of others. This act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the parents to make their children — as far as their power goes — contented with the condition thus acquired. Hence parents cannot regard their child as, in a manner, a thing of their own making; for a being endowed with freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if it were their own property, or even to leave it to chance; because they have brought a being into the world who becomes in fact a citizen of the world, and they have placed that being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with indifference, even according to the natural conceptions of right.

Kant clearly set out the creation of peril argument. In this brief paragraph, he captured all the main points of the causal theory. Kant specifically repudiates the theory of parental ownership and argues that children have rights. He also argues against the idea of tacit consent of the child. Instead of a merely biological explanation of obligation, he is making a clear argument that obligation comes from the actions of the parents. However, like Blackstone, Kant did not explore the wider implications of this argument.

The causal argument for parental obligations was restated by the utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick in the 1874 book The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick had certainly read both Kant and Blackstone, so it seems likely that he knew of the causal argument for parental obligations from their earlier statements of it. He restated the principle in his own words, although this was again only a minor argument in the book and not the main purpose of the work. Sidgwick argued succinctly that parents have causal parental obligations based on creation of peril:

And this leads to what we may conveniently examine next, the duty of parents to children. This too we might partly classify under a different head, viz. that of duties arising out of special needs: for no doubt children are naturally objects of compassion, on account of their helplessness, to others besides their parents. But on the latter they have a claim of a different kind, springing from the universally recognised duty of not causing pain or any harm to other human beings, directly or indirectly, except in the way of deserved punishment: for the parent, being the cause of the child’s existing in a helpless condition, would be indirectly the cause of the suffering and death that would result to it if neglected.

After this brilliantly clear summary, Sidgwick begins to waffle that this issue is all very complicated, and then changes the topic. He did not explore the theory in any more detail. Nonetheless, many later writers who have made the causal argument from parental obligations have referred to Sidgwick as an influence.

What are the implications of this theory that all these early thinkers fail to remark on? This will be the subject of a future post, but one mind-blowing example is that you cannot give up parental obligations.

The Argument from Adoption Does Not Prove That Parental Obligations Are Voluntary

The theory of voluntary parental obligations holds that parents acquire obligations to their children by volunteering for those obligations. The claim is that only those who voluntarily accept the responsibility for parenting a child are obliged to do so, and only from the point that they accept this role onwards, and only unless or until they give it up for adoption. The justification made for this theory is based on claims about how adoptive parents gain obligations. The line of argument runs as follows:

1. Adoptive parents become parents by voluntary agreement.
2. Adoptive parents have the same obligations as biological parents.
3. Any parent (biological or adoptive) may legitimately divest themselves of enforceable parental obligation voluntarily by putting up their child for adoption.
4. Therefore all parental obligations arise from voluntary agreement.

As will be argued in this article, every premise in this line of argument is false, and the conclusion is false too.

1. It Is Not Voluntary Agreement That Obligates Adoptive Parents

The argument that adopters have positive obligations implies that adopted children have an enforceable claim against their adopters. How can this claim arise? It cannot be as a result of contract, since children cannot contract. One might argue over exactly when young adults may be able to consent to their own adoption, but there is no way a young child can be said to consent to being adopted.

Also, any agreement to adoption between the biological parents and the adopters is irrelevant since it cannot explain how the child has a claim on the adopter. It is the child that has the claim and the child cannot consent. The fact that the biological parents and adopters have both consented does not change that.

If the child does have a claim on the adopter, it can only be as a result of tort. A tort claim arises independently of consent or contract. A tort could impose obligations on the adopter as a result of the actions of the adopter. What actions could those be?

The only way that an adopter could have positive obligations to a child is through the adopter being responsible for a child being in a state of peril. As I have argued elsewhere, an adoptive parent effectively removes the child from the obligated caregiver in the child's life, which is the creation of a state of peril, and this gives the adoptive parent a positive obligation to act as the new caregiver.

Even if the biological parents were not fulfilling all their obligations, the adoptive parents are still effectively cutting off any chance that the child has of receiving care from the biological parent. This is the creation of peril, and it is mitigated by the adoptive parent meeting the obligations instead.

Finding an abandoned child and giving it shelter does not create an enforceable parental obligation on the rescuer from the child. Although a rescuer does not acquire parental obligations the minute he saves an abandoned baby, he is temporarily obliged to look after the child whilst in possession of it, and to pass on the child responsibly. This is because a rescuer is effectively precluding the child from anyone else's care in that time and is therefore temporarily responsible for relieving the child's peril during that time. The same temporary obligations apply to foster parents.

Formal adoption differs from rescue or fostering because it entails the exclusion of anyone else from parenting the child. Because of this, formal adoption creates enforceable parental obligations because the adopter is permanently excluding anyone else from caring for the child.

If you tell others not to attempt saving a non-swimmer who has fallen in to a pool because you intend to be the saviour, then you are responsible for relieving that non-swimmer from peril. Having prevented the non-swimmer from benefitting from any other saviour, you now have a responsibility to follow through otherwise you would cause the resultant drowning via creation of peril.

2. Adoptive Parents Do Not Have Exactly the Same Obligations as Biological Parents

The fact that biological parents and adoptive parents both have obligations does not prove that obligations are voluntary. It does not follow that biological parents acquire their obligations voluntarily because adopters volunteer for their role. On the contrary, as argued above, it is the other way around. Adoptive parents acquire obligations in a similar way to biological parents: by tort as a consequence of actions that result in creation of peril (albeit through different circumstances).

The premise that biological parents have exactly the same obligations as adoptive parents is merely an assertion and is not accurate. As I have argued in another post, a biological parent who gives up their child has not legitimately lost their obligation, but rather they have effectively instructed an agent to fulfil the obligation on their behalf. If the adopter failed to fulfil obligations on behalf of the biological parent, the child would arguably still have an enforceable claim against the original parent. In this way a biological parent always has a residual obligation that could be called upon, whereas an adopter has the obligations of a kind of agent. The two are not the same.

3. No Parent Can Legitimately Divest Themselves of Parental Obligations

The fact that the institution of adoption exists is not proof that parental obligation is legitimately optional. As I have argued elsewhere, parents cannot legitimately absolve themselves of their obligation solely by passing on responsibility to an adopter, because a parent's obligation is to the child.. However, if parents are not living up to their obligations, the first concern is the interest of the child.

Accepting the institution of adoption recognises that a bad situation is preferable to a catastrophic situation. If someone fails to comply with their obligations, it is better that they do so in a way that can be mitigated than if they do so in a way that leads to disaster.

It is not legitimate for the pilot of a passenger plane to choose to parachute out mid-flight, but I would still much rather that he made arrangements with someone to take over the plane safely than if he just let go of the controls, parachuted out, and let the aircraft plummet to the ground.

There is no contradiction between the argument that it is in the best interests of children for adoption to be legal and the argument that it is not morally legitimate for parents to give their children up for adoption. Rather, the rationale is simply that in cases where parental obligations are unenforceable, the interests of the children take priority over other considerations.

4. Parental Obligations Arise From Action Not Agreement

The theory of voluntary parental obligations is riddled with problems:

• Since children cannot contract, it relies on an imaginary social contract between parents and every other adult.
• It cannot hold men responsible for any children that they father.
• It cannot explain why the act of volunteering for obligations gives someone legitimate authority over any particular child.
• Lastly, as has been discussed in this post, it is based on an argument from adoption which is false.

The theory of voluntary obligations is wrong because parental obligations are not voluntary. They are the result of causal action. Parents are those who engage in actions that can cause the creation of a child in a state of peril. Parents are responsible for the state of peril and therefore have an obligation by tort to remove the peril.

Adoptive parents also acquire positive obligations through actions that result in creation of peril: adopters exclude a child from their legitimate claim on their biological parents.

But adoption is not exactly the same as biological parenthood. It is complicated by the fact that biological parents never legitimately lose their obligations, which implies that biological parents are always residually obliged, even when they have given up their children to adopters.

Adoption is a kind of damage control. It is a way of making the best of a bad situation. It does not prove the argument that parental obligations are voluntary.